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1. INTRODUCTION

Although final determination of the merits of the dispute is still several years in the
making, Abaclat v. Argentine Republic1 has already been declared one of the most

* D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); Ph.D., University of Camridge (U.K.); J.D., Duke University; M.P.W.,

University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author, who is admitted to
practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and Wales, is an Associate
Professor of Law at the University of Missouri. This Article was written while the author was the Henry G.
Schermers Fellow at the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and the Netherlands Institute for
Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences, and the author gratefully acknowledges the
contributions of both institutions. The author also thanks Hans van Houtte and participants in the Schermers
Workshop on "Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context: Arbitration, Litigation, Settlement and Beyond"
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. At this point, the tribunal has rendered only preliminary jurisdictional and dissenting awards. See
Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/0715, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO236.pdf;
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controversial arbitrations to arise in recent years. 2 The proceedings address several
noteworthy items as a matter of first impression, including the question of whether
sovereign bonds constitute an "investment" 3 under the relevant treaties. 4 However, much
of Abaclat's notoriety is due to the unusually large number of claimants in this case,
60,000 Italian bondholders who were seeking to join their claims together in a single
proceeding. 5 While both the claimants and a majority of the arbitrators were quick to note
that the arbitration was not brought on a classwide basis,6 the framing of the procedure as
involving "mass" rather than class claims has done little to diminish concerns that U.S.
litigation techniques, most particularly the dreaded class action, are currently making
their way into international investment law. 7
Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0237.pdf
2. The members of the Oil-Gas-Energy-Mining-Infrastructure Dispute Management (OGEMID)
listserve named the majority's preliminary award in Abaclat the leading arbitration decision of 2011 as well as
the most controversial or surprising decision of the year, with the dissenting award being named runner-up in
both categories. See OGEMZD Awards 2011, TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT., http://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/ogemidawards/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (listing the winners of the OGEMID Awards).
3. This issue has already generated a significant amount of commentary. See generally William W.
Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID
System, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 407, 411-32
(Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (discussing sovereign debt issues); Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a
Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 335, 337-53 (2006) (discussing
sovereign debt issues); Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, lus Cogens, TransitionalJustice and
Other Trends of the Debateon Odious Debt: A Response to the World Bank DiscussionPaperon Odious Debts,
48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 60-74 (2009) (discussing sovereign debt); Joanna Simdes, Sovereign Bond
Disputes Before ICSID Tribunals: Lessons from the Argentina Crisis, 17 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 683, 691-99
(2011) (discussing sovereign bonds as an investment under Article 25 of ICSID Convention); Daniella Strik,
Investment Protectionof Sovereign Debt and Its Implications on the Future ofInvestment Law in the EU, 29 J.
INT'L ARB. 183, 183 (2012) (discussing the recent debate about sovereign debt instruments and protection
against sovereign debt default); S.I. Strong, Collective Arbitration in ICSID Disputes: Abaclat (formerly
Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, 17 IBA ARB. NEWS 84 (Apr. 2012) (explaining and discussing Abaclat);
Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora'sBox: Sovereign Bonds in InternationalArbitration, 101 AM. J. INT'L L.
711, 718-32 (2007) (discussing ICSID jurisdiction over debt instruments); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing
Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (2009) (exploring standardization of arbitration clauses in sovereign bond
contracts); Robert M. Ziff, The Sovereign Debtor's Prison:Analysis of the Argentine Crisis Arbitrations and
Implicationsfor Investment Treaty Law, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 345, 346-49 (2011) (discussing
arbitrations under Argentinean BITs).
4. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 35 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (stating that this was the first
dispute of this nature in an ICSID arbitration); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]
(describing the settlement of international investment disputes); Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina
and the Republic of Italy on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, May 22, 1990 (hereinafter
Argentina-Italy BIT], availableat http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/italy_argentina it.pdf.
5. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, % 295, 488 (stating that Abaclat is the first ICSID case
where "mass claims" have been brought).
6. See id
104, 294 (stating that case is not a "class action").
7. The vagaries of U.S. class actions are well-documented. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 3-7 (2000) (discussing U.S. class action
suits); RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 9-12 (2004) (comparing U.S. class actions to similar litigation in other jurisdictions); Kevin R.
Johnson, InternationalHuman Rights Class Actions: New Frontiersfor Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
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Although Abaclat marks the first time that an investment tribunal has accepted
jurisdiction over a proceeding of this nature, 8 it is not the first time that a large-scale
9
claim has been brought in the context of treaty-based arbitration, nor is it likely to be the
0
and
last. Two other group claims against Argentina are currently pending,'
in
arbitrations
commentators have speculated about opportunities for mass investment
other contexts.'I
REv. 643, 646-47 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 516-18 (2003) (discussing evolution of U.S. class actions); George Rutherglen, WalMart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. INBRIEF 24, 28 (2012)
(explaining the effect of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning class suits); Edward T. Schroeder,
Note, A Tort by Any Other Name? In Search of the DistinctionBetween Regulation Through Litigation and
Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEX. L. REv. 897, 897-98 (2005) (discussing criticism of U.S. class-action
litigation).
8. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, IM295, 488. Other large multiparty proceedings have been
filed with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in the past, including those
with over 100 claimants. See Anderson v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, 1 3
(May 10, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/AndersonvCostaRicaAwardl9May2010.pdf
(involving 137 Canadian claimants proceeding under the ICSID Additional Facility); Funnekotter v. Republic
of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://italaw.com/documents/
ZimbabweAward.pdf (involving 13 named claimants with over 1500 other potential participants waiting in the
2 (Jan. 5, 2010),
wings); AgricAfrica Ltd. Newsletter No. 32, ZIMBABWE LIFESTYLE BLOG
http://zimbabwefood.blogspot.com/2010/01/this-should-be-of-interest-to-everyone.html (noting existence of
other potential claimants in Funnekotter). However, Abaclat is unique in the international investment arena in
terms of the scope, scale, and nature of claims brought. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 171 (AbiSaab, dissenting) (discussing novelty of mass claims in investment context); S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures in
Abaclat v. Argentine Republic: Are They Consistent with the InternationalInvestment Regime?, 3 Y.B. INT'L
ARB. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Abaclat].
9. A number of claimants came to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 2003 seeking to bring an
action "on [their] own behalf and by proxy and representation on behalf of all Iranian citizens," although the
claim was denied on the grounds that group actions are not permitted under the Claims Settlement Declaration
2, 13 (2003). Large-scale
or tribunal precedent. Sheibani v. United States, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 946,
claims have also been brought against the Bank for International Settlements, although those proceedings also
failed. See Lea Haber Kuck & Gregory A. Litt, InternationalClass Arbitration,in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS: A
PRACTITIONERS GUIDE To GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 700, 726-27 (Paul

Karlsgodt ed., 2012) (discussing large-scale claims brought against the Bank for International Settlements);
Scott Armstrong Spence, Organizing an Arbitration Involving an International Organization and Multiple
PrivateParties: The Example of the Bank for InternationalSettlements Arbitration, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 309, 316
(2004) (noting instruments permitting arbitration involving the Bank for International Settlements "did not
contemplate class action proceedings nor allow [arbitrators] to certify a class").
10. See Alemanni v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8; Alpi v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/9. Because there is no system of binding precedent in investment arbitration, it is unclear
whether the tribunals in Alemanni or Alpi will adopt the reasoning in Abaclat and accept jurisdiction over all the
parties. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:

SUBSTANTIVE

PRINCIPLES 71-76 (2008) (discussing precedent in investment arbitration); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 361-78 (2007) (noting a form of soft
precedent exists).
11. Several analysts have highlighted the possibility of a mass investment action relating to the Greek
debt crisis. See News in Brief German Law Firm Eyes Case over Sovereign Debt Restructuring,3 INVESTMENT
TREATY NEws 19, 19 (Apr. 2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/iisd itnapril 2012 en.pdf (discussing Greek
sovereign debt under the BIT between Germany and Greece); Patrick Heneghan & Markus Perkams, The
Clawback: Can Arbitration Help Greek Bondholders Gain Redress?, LEGALWEEK (May 11, 2012),
http://www.legalweeklaw.com/abstract/clawback-arbitration-help-greek-bondholders-gain-redress-12089
(discussing issues relating to Greek sovereign debt issues). Other commentators have suggested that the

HeinOnline -- 38 J. Corp. L. 261 2012-2013

262

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 38:2

While there is still a long way to go before the jurisdictional awards rendered in
Abaclat can be considered final, 12 the majority and dissenting awards will doubtless
prove groundbreaking on a number of important issues. Certainly there will be extensive
analysis regarding the arbitrability of sovereign debt concerns, the interpretation of
silence in an investment treaty, and a variety of related matters. 13 However, this Article
focuses on perhaps the most challenging and controversial issue, namely the question of
the propriety of mass procedures from an international regulatory law perspective.
The idea of investment law as a form of international regulation is not new. 14
Indeed, a growing number of commentators have framed the international investment
regime as reflecting a type of "global administrative law" 15 or "global governance." 1 6
Chevron-Ecuador dispute might at some point yield class or collective procedures under the U.S.-Ecuador
BIT. See MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 217-18 (2008)

(discussing future possibilities for large-scale investment arbitration). Still other observers have suggested that
countries such as Portugal may need to take heed of Abaclat. See Yuriy Vilner, Realities and Prioritiesof
Portugal's Debt Management, Pt. IV, JURIST-DATELINE, Apr. 12, 2012, http://jurist.org/dateline/
2012/04/yuriy-vilner-portugal-debt.php (examining possible application of Abaclat to Portugal's sovereign
debt).
12. It is very likely that Argentina will seek to annul the award after the conclusion of the proceedings on
the merits, not only because of the novelty of the issues at stake, but because Argentina has brought annulment
proceedings every time a final award has been rendered against it. See Karen Halverson Cross, Investment
ArbitrationPanel Upholds Jurisdiction to Hear Mass Bondholder Claims Against Argentina, 15 AM. SOC'Y OF
INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Nov. 21, 2011), www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insightilll2l.pdf (discussing likelihood of
annulment proceedings in Abaclat); Steven Smith et al., InternationalCommercial Dispute Resolution, 44 INT'L
LAW. 113, 127 (2010) (discussing annulment proceedings previously brought by Argentina in ICSID disputes).
Therefore, it will be years before the jurisdictional determinations outlined in the recent awards can be
considered final.
13. Debate about these issues has already begun. See supra note 3 (surveying different opinions on these
issues).
14. "There is no consensus in policy or academic circles as to what exactly is connoted by the term
regulation." Colin Scott, Privatizationand Regulatory Regimes, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY,
651, 653 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). One classic definition states that regulation involves "sustained and
focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are socially valued," although modem critics
have expanded the scope of application to include regulatory activity undertaken by private actors and other
decentralized entities. Id (quoting Phillip Selznick, Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation, in
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 363, 363-67 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985)).

15. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 124-27, 149 (2006); see also Benedict Kingsbury et al., The
Emergence of GlobalAdministrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15 (2005) (discussing the growing
field of global administrative law); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as
Governance: Fairand Equitable Treatment, Proportionalityand the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in
50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, 14 ICCA CONG. SER. 5, 10 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2008)
("Global administrative law is concerned with the exercise of public authority by bodies outside the State, and
by States in ways that reach beyond the State and its law."); Alex Mills, Antinomies ofPublic and Privateat the
Foundations of International Investment Law and Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 469, 501-02 (2011)
(discussing international investment law as a "single uniform public international system"); Richard B. Stewart,
The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695, 718 (2005)
(discussing six basic elements of administrative law); Stephan W. Schill, EnhancingInternationalInvestment
Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J.
INT'L L. 57, 80-81, 85 (2011) [hereinafter Schill, Legitimacy] (discussing investment treaty arbitration
exercising governance).
16. Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 15, at 5; see also Gus Van Harten, Investment Rules and the Denial of
Change, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 893, 894-95 (2010) (reviewing DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING
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However, most of the analysis has centered on the way in which the various treaties and
17
international agreements are said to constitute a type of "international legislation."
While there is a continuing need to consider the ways in which international investment
law constitutes a form of traditional regulation, this Article brings a new critical
perspective-that of new governance theory-to bear on the question of mass procedures
in investment arbitration. 18
New governance analysis reflects "a widespread movement away from a top-down
approach in public governance to an increasingly hybrid interaction of public and private
actors." 1 9 One area of inquiry involves the concept of regulatory litigation, which arises
when a "diffuse set of regulators," including "private citizens, public regulatory bodies,
20
nongovernmental organizations, and private market agents[,] ... regulate social harm"
by "us[ing] litigation and the courts to achieve and apply regulatory outcomes to entire
industries." 2 1 For years, regulatory litigation has been considered primarily a U.S.
phenomenon, given the widespread reliance in the United States on private attorneys
general to enforce various public laws in an otherwise highly deregulated market
environment. 22 However, other legal systems have also begun to consider the potential
usefulness of this sort of regulatory device, and it may be that Abaclat has brought
23
regulatory litigation techniques into the world of investment arbitration.

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE (2008)).

17. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
123, 128 (2003); see also Josd E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 2 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 19 (2012)
(discussing regulatory implications of investment law); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral
Investment Treaties on Customary International Law, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 27, 29 (2004) (discussing
regulatory elements of bilateral investment treaties).
18. New governance theory attempts to identify new regulatory mechanisms that fall between traditional
command and control models of regulation and deregulated markets. See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble,
Predict,Nudge: How BehavioralEconomics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2100 (2008)
(discussing new governance theory); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening
InternationalRegulation Through TransnationalNew Governance: Overcoming the OrchestrationDeficit, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 505-06 (2009) (describing emerging roles for principal actors in state
regulation); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative
State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (2011) (discussing efforts to escape limits of command-and-control administration);
Scott, supra note 14, at 651-52 (discussing the transfer of regulation from the public to the private sector). See
generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REv. 267 (1998) (describing models of regulation based on new governance theory).
19. Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining ParadoxBoundaries:Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and
InternationalLaw, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 197, 201 (2004); see also Scott, supra note 14, at 651 (describing
privatization of regulatory regimes).
20. J. Maria Glover, The StructuralRole of PrivateEnforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1137, 1146 (2012).
21. Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 96 (2011) (quoting
ANDREW P. MORRIS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 1 (2009)).
22. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
288, 344 (2010) (noting that the United States has long accepted the concept of private attorneys general). Not
all regulatory litigation is undertaken by private actors. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (discussing public forms
of regulatory litigation); see also Miriam H. Bayer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612-25 (2012)
(discussing corporate governance and regulation from non-institutional forces); Timothy Meyer, Comment,
Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation and the New Federalism, 95
CALIF. L. REv. 885, 886 (2007) (describing state attorneys generals as creators of state-based regulation).
23. Although European nations have typically been painted as preferring to adopt a large number of
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One of the best-known forms of regulatory litigation is the U.S. class action, which
uses large-scale representative relief, often combined with punitive or treble damages, to
achieve a variety of goals, including those of a regulatory nature. 24 However, the
correlation between large-scale relief and regulation is not exact.25 For example, while a
number of common and civil law jurisdictions have adopted procedures roughly similar
to U.S.-style class actions, these jurisdictions "are not in unanimous agreement as to
whether" regulatory goals "should form an overarching principle of class litigation." 26
This raises the interesting question of whether the use of large-scale litigation
techniques in Abaclat constitutes an international form of "regulatory arbitration" that is
similar in nature to domestic or international forms of regulatory litigation. 27 This is a
novel issue, for although the concept of regulatory litigation, 28 including transnational
legislative and administrative enactments that deny both the need and opportunity for any sort of "private"
regulation through litigation, that characterization may no longer be true. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 345
(discussing potential transition in Europe towards class actions). Jurisdictions other than the United States may
be in the process of adopting their own forms of regulatory litigation as the principle of "adversarial legalism"
takes root around the world. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3
(2001) (defining adversarial legalism as policymaking by means of litigation); Francesca Bignami, Cooperative
Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J.
COMP. L. 411, 412 (2011) (considering European regulatory model); R. Daniel Kelemen, Suing for Europe:
Adversarial Legalism and European Governance, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 101, 102 (2006) (arguing that a shift
towards U.S. legal style is emerging in the European Union); Richard A. Nagareda, AggregateLitigation Across
the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51 (2009) (discussing the
emergence in Europe of procedures for aggregate litigation); Adam Samuel, Consumer FinancialServices in
Britain: New Approaches to Dispute Resolution and Avoidance, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 649, 653-54, 65662 (2002) (discussing European alternatives to various forms of regulation); Scott, supra note 14, at 656, 659
(discussing the formalization of norms within regulatory regimes and the transition to the regulatory state).
24. The three best-known rationales for class actions are regulation, compensation, and efficiency,
although class suits can provide additional benefits such as information sharing, accountability, and
transparency rationales. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 68-72 (discussing class actions as a tool for
regulation); MULHERON, supra note 7, at 47-66 (discussing rationales for class relief outside the United States);
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation,43 GA. L. REV. 63, 92111 (2008) (discussing positive externalities of securities class actions).
25. See S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a
New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 12) [hereinafter Strong,
RegulatoryLitigation] (discussing use of collective redress as a means of regulation in the European Union).
26. MULHERON, supra note 7, at 63. See generally 622 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (Deborah Hensler et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE ANNALS] (discussing
large-scale litigation in over 30 countries).
27. The term "regulatory arbitration" was first coined by Marc Blessing to describe arbitral proceedings
taken in connection with antitrust or competition law claims. See Assimakis P. Komninos, Assistance by the
European Commission and Member States Authorities in Arbitration,in EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION:
A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 727, 740 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011) (discussing
regulatory arbitration and Blessing's use of the term). Blessing believed that
the combination of the outsourced regulatory task and the judicial tasks, accomplished by a
competent arbitrator . . . will be the most efficient tool to review and, if need be, sanction anticompetitive behaviour arising out of a concentration, and to install in business practice the
objectives which the Commission aims to achieve through its merger control.
MARC BLESSING, ARBITRATING ANTITRUST AND MERGER CONTROL ISSUES, 14 SwisS COMM. L. SER. 197

(2003). Although Blessing's version of regulatory arbitration is in many ways consistent with the principles
described in this Article, the current discussion uses the term more broadly than Blessing.
28. See Glover, supra note 20, at 1140 (discussing ex post law enforcement resulting from private suits);
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regulatory litigation, 29 has been considered at various points in the past, there is little or
no existing analysis regarding the concept of "regulatory arbitration," even though
several observers have suggested arbitration as a possible solution to certain problems
associated with transnational regulation. 3 0
The concept of regulatory arbitration in Abaclat is particularly intriguing given
31
recent suggestions that investment law constitutes a type of international regulation. If
the investment regime constitutes an internally stable, relatively closed legal system, then
it may be possible to consider whether the use of techniques commonly found in largescale regulatory litigation is consistent with or perhaps even necessary to fulfill the
32
objectives of the purported regulatory regime as a matter of institutional design. This
type of inquiry is particularly useful because it appears unlikely that standard treaty
analyses will result in a universally acceptable determination about the propriety of mass
procedures in investment arbitration. 33 The hypothesis to be tested here is that if the use
of large-scale litigation techniques in Abaclat constitutes a form of regulatory arbitration
and if regulatory arbitration falls within the institutional design parameters of the
investment regime, then the use of mass procedures in Abaclat can be legitimated without

Luff, supra note 21, at 75 (noting regulatory litigation arose out of a desire to expand regulatory capacity);
Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 4) (discussing different forms of regulatory
litigation).
29. Sometimes the discussion of transnational regulatory litigation focuses on regulatory issues per se.
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under FederalSecurities Law: ManagingJurisdictional
Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 35 (2007) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Securities] (discussing global class
actions as a means of regulation); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 11-12 (discussing regulatory mismatches);
Stewart, supra note 15, at 709 (discussing regulatory concerns in a global context). At other times, the analysis
is framed as a matter of civil procedure, although the issues raised involve questions that relate to regulatory
litigation. See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class
Actions, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465, 479 (2009) (discussing exportation of national norms in international suits);
John C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
134, 134 (1997) (questioning preclusive effect of U.S. class action litigation in England); Tanya J. Monestier,
Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicala, 86 TuL. L. REv. 1, 44-45 (2011)
(discussing preclusive effect of U.S. class actions outside the U.S.); Rachael Mulheron, The Recognition, and
Res JudicataEffect, of a United States Class Actions Judgment in England: A Rebuttal of Vivendi, 75 MOD. L.
REv. 180, 181-82 (2012) [hereinafter Mulheron, Vivendi] (predicting that English courts will not enforce U.S.
decisions involving English class members); Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 313, 332-69 (2011) (comparing U.S. principles of
preclusion with those of several European countries).
30. See Deborah Hensler, How Economic Globalisation Is Helping to Construct a Private Transnational
Legal Order, in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LAW 249, 256-59 (Sam Muller et al. eds.,
2011) (hereinafter Hensler, FUTURE] (suggesting arbitration can overcome certain problems associated with

international litigation); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 10 (suggesting arbitration can resolve certain problems
associated with large-scale international suits); S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class
Arbitration: The United States and Canada Compared, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 921, 969-80 (2012)
[hereinafter Strong, Canada] (describing how class arbitration can overcome problems with national and

international class actions in the United States and Canada).
31. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (noting that a number of commentators have
characterized investment law as a type of global administrative law).
32. See infra notes 276-79 and accompanying text (explaining the "liberal internationalist" perspective on
investment law).
33. See infra note 284 and accompanying text (acknowledging the "deeper uncertainties" involving the
purpose of international investment law).
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having to rely on difficult questions of treaty interpretation. 34
The structure of the Article is as follows. First, Part II introduces the basic facts and
analytical framework of Abaclat so as to set further analysis in context. 35 Next, Part III
describes the parameters of regulatory litigation and analyzes the way in which regulatory
litigation operates in an international legal environment. Part IV puts the concepts of
regulatory litigation and transnational regulatory litigation into the arbitral context so as
to develop the notion of regulatory arbitration. In so doing, the discussion draws on
recent developments involving class and collective arbitration in the United States and
elsewhere, so as to put Abaclat into global context. Next, Part V uses the principles
developed in Part III and IV to determine whether Abaclat constitutes a form of
regulatory arbitration and whether that mechanism is consistent with the investment
regime. Finally, Part VI concludes the discussion with some closing observations about
how regulatory issues and mass claims procedures can and should be considered under
international investment law.
II. ABACLAT V.ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

Abaclat v. Argentine Republic arose as a result of Argentina's default on
approximately $100 billion worth of sovereign debt in 2001, a move that made the
investments of thousands of Italian bondholders worthless. 36 In September 2002, eight
major Italian banks formed an associazione non riconosciuta under the name
I'Associazione per la Tutela degli Investitori in titoli Argentini, or "Task Force
Argentina" (TFA).3 7 The purpose of TFA was to "represent the interests of the Italian
bondholders in pursuing a negotiated settlement with Argentina." 38
After several years of negotiations and other proceedings, TFA concluded that
further efforts to resolve the matter with Argentina were futile, leading TFA to seek and
obtain a new mandate from individual and institutional bondholders allowing TFA to file
an arbitration with ICSID. 39 The so-called Mandate Package was initially accepted by
over 180,000 bondholders, although the number of claimants subsequently dropped to

34. Interpretive issues are particularly problematic in Abaclat given the silence of the relevant treaties and
procedural rules on the question of mass procedures. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. APB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, $1297, 517 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf (acknowledging the silence of the relevant
treaties); Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, % 154-75 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (noting the silence of the relevant treaties); see
also infra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. law regarding contractual silence in cases involving
class arbitration).
35. The dispute is extremely complex, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, and the two awards
are quite long. See generally Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (measuring over 280 pages in length);
Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (measuring 105 pages in length). Therefore, this
Part only raises those matters that are relevant to the current Article.
36. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 58.
37. Id. 165.
38. Id 66.
39. See id. T 84-85. The author discusses the mandate and ancillary documents in detail elsewhere. See
S.I. Strong, Mass Torts and Arbitration: Lessons from Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, in UNCERTAINTY AND
MASS TORT: CAUSATION AND PROOF (Josd Ferrer Beltrdn et al. eds., forthcoming 2012).
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60,000.40 After the tribunal was duly appointed, the parties and the tribunal agreed to
bifurcate proceedings into a jurisdictional phase and a merits phase. 4 1 At the time of
writing, only the jurisdictional issues have been addressed in the majority and dissenting
award. 42
One important issue involves the way in which the tribunal defined and justified the
use of mass procedures. Rather than characterizing the arbitration as either class or
collective in nature, the majority framed the dispute as involving a "mass proceeding"
that used a "hybrid" of two different types of group litigation techniques, namely
aggregate relief and representative relief.4 3
There are several benefits to the majority's analytical approach. First, it allowed the
majority to set aside certain potentially problematic case law from the United States
concerning class arbitration. 44 While it is always difficult to identify the extent to which
investment tribunals can refer to principles of national law, existing analyses tend to
focus on issues of substantive law rather than procedural law. 45 However, the ability to
transfer regulatory litigation techniques from one legal system to another is somewhat
questionable, since the use of litigation as a regulatory mechanism gives rise to
complicated and politically sensitive issues relating to institutional and dispute system
design. 46 Therefore, the persuasive power of U.S. decisions on class arbitration is highly
questionable in the investment context. 47
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the majority's analytical method allowed the
arbitrators to unbundle the various issues at stake and consider questions of consent and
40. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
1, 216, 592 (explaining how the number of claimants
dropped). One of the novel issues raised in Abaclat is whether and to what extent individual parties to a
multiparty proceeding can withdraw without affecting the standing of the remaining disputants. See id. T 294.
This issue is beyond the scope of the current Article.
41. See id. 127 (outlining the procedural calendar).
42. See generally id; Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf.
43. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
483, 488 (citing S.I. Strong, From Class to Collective: The
De-Americanization of Class Arbitration, 26 ARB. INT'L 493, 506-08 (2010) [hereinafter Strong, DeAmericanization] (misattributed to "Stacy I. Starck")). For purposes of the award, the majority set aside a third
type of collective redress: settlement-only relief. See id. 483 n.176 (noting three types of large-scale arbitral
relief).
44. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (discussing enforceability
of waivers of class arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (discussing the propriety of class arbitration in the face of contractual silence or
ambiguity).
45. See McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 66 (noting "BITs, as treaties, 'must be interpreted
according to the Law of Nations, and not according to any municipal code,"' and indicating that the "applicable
law for the interpretation of the treaty is international law," as defined primarily by Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (internal citations omitted)). But see id. at 69 (stating "[t]he fact that the
interpretation of BITs is governed by public international law does not exclude domestic law from consideration
by investment treaty tribunals" but noting "[t]he main role of domestic law is in defining the scope of the
investment protected").
46. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 19).
47. Although the majority considered arguments from claimants regarding the historical development of
class arbitration in the United States, the majority award did not cite any U.S. cases concerning class arbitration,
unlike the dissent. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
146, 148-53 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (citing two
U.S. cases when discussing the propriety of large-scale arbitration in absence of express consent).
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admissibility separately. 48 Although the award outlined some significant differences
between representative and aggregate proceedings, which are the two primary forms of
large-scale dispute resolution, the majority recognized that both
share a common "raison d'etre": Collective proceedings emerge[] where they
constitute[] the only way to ensure an effective remedy in protection of a
substantive right provided by contract or law; in other words, collective
proceedings [a]re seen as necessary, where the absence of such mechanism
would defacto ... result[] in depriving the claimants of their substantive rights
due to the lack of appropriate mechanism. 4 9
This concept of "an effective remedy" plays an important role in regulatory
litigation and arbitration, particularly with respect to issues relating to institutional design
and regulatory intent or effect, since the idea of an effective remedy focuses on whether
there is a need to adopt a particular procedural device such as those involving class or
collective relief.50 Thus, some courts "have concluded that legal systems lacking" claim
aggregation "do not afford a meaningful remedy to class action plaintiffs, and on that
basis have held foreign fora to be inadequate" in class suits. 5 1 Questions about whether
bilateral proceedings are sufficient to provide an effective remedy could also be
important in determining whether the courts of the host state provide for fair and
equitable treatment of investors. 52
Rather than characterizing the claims in Abaclat as either representative or
aggregative in nature, the majority took the view that elements of both types of
proceedings were present, "in the sense that . .. [the arbitration] starts as aggregate
proceedings, but then continues with features similar to representative proceedings due to
the high number of Claimants involved." 53 Aggregative elements were found in the

48. The Abaclat majority award considered "the concept of jurisdiction under the [ICSID] Convention" to
cover "issues which may usually be regarded as issues of 'admissibility' as well as jurisdiction per se. Abaclat
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 245. Lack of jurisdiction means that the "claim cannot at all be brought in front of
the body called upon" whereas "a lack of admissibility means that the claim was neither fit nor mature for
judicial treatment." Id. 247(i). Abaclat also defined admissibility as relating to "the question whether ordering
the parties to proceed collectively is within the scope of the Tribunal's discretion and authority." Id. 1485.
49. Id. 1 484 (quoting Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43). The dissent denied that failure to
allow the claims to proceed en masse would deprive the claimants of their substantive rights. See Abaclat,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, % 254-57 (Abi-Saab, dissenting).
50. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing need for regulatory litigation).
51. Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 37; see also In re Lemout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 208 F. Supp.
2d 74, 91-93 (D. Mass. 2002) (discussing the doctrine of forum non conveniens); DeRensis v. Coopers &
Lybrand Chartered Accts., 930 F. Supp. 1003, 1007-09 (D.N.J. 1996) (discussing the public and private
interests that are relevant when choosing an alternative forum).
52. See McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 226-47 (discussing fair and equitable treatment standard).
The fact that Argentina did not provide for collective redress mechanisms in its national courts was relevant to
484, 587 (noting Argentina's legal system
the majority's decision. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
does not provide for mass claims).
53. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 488 (discussing how both types of collective preceedings share
common traits). Although the majority did not raise this possibility, the proceedings in Abaclat could also be
framed as an opt-in representative proceeding, wherein the parties must affirmatively signal their assent to the
mass proceedings but thereafter cede control of the conduct of the dispute to the lead claimant or other qualified
representative, who acts as an agent for the passive members of the group. See Deborah R. Hensler, The
Globalizationof Class Actions: An Overview, in THE ANNALS, supra note 26, at 7, 15-17 (discussing class and
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claimants' "individual and conscious choice of participating in the arbitration" while
representative features were evident in the fact that claimants' "participation is thereafter
limited to a passive participation in the sense that a third party, TFA, represents their
interests and makes on their behalf all the decisions relating to the conduct of the
proceedings." 54 Representative elements could also be seen in the fact that "[t]he high
number of Claimants . .. makes it impossible for the representative [of the Claimants] to
take into account individual interests of individual Claimants, and rather limits the
55
proceedings to the defense of interests common to the entire group of Claimants."
The distinction between aggregative and representative procedures could be
important to the question of whether Abaclat acts as a form of regulatory arbitration,
since the best-known type of regulatory procedures-the U.S.-style class action-is
representative in nature. 56 However, non-representative forms of collective redress also
exist, both in the United States and elsewhere, and may constitute a form of regulatory
litigation or arbitration. 5 7
The dissent disagreed with the characterization of the proceedings in a variety of
ways. 58 For example, the dissent believed the arbitration did not involve aggregated relief
because aggregated proceedings do not involve a "change or alteration of the procedure
followed to handle these claims other than as normal individual claims." 59 Instead,
claims in aggregated proceedings are consolidated only during the pre-trial period and are
subsequently separated for individual hearings. 60 Representative proceedings, on the
collective procedures in multiple jurisdictions around the world).
54. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 487. While it may appear odd to U.S.-trained lawyers to have
what looks like a lead plaintiff acting without any sort of independent interest in the dispute, many jurisdictions
not only permit but require claims for collective redress to be brought by official organizations or associations
rather than by an interested individual him or herself. See Hensler, supra note 53, at 14 (discussing who has
standing to bring mass claims cases); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 503-04 (discussing nonclass forms of large-scale arbitration and litigation). When viewed from that perspective, TFA's role as an agent
does not appear problematic.
55. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 487.
56. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation,supra note 25 (considering the possibility of regulatory litigation in
the United States and Europe). However, not every class action can be considered regulatory. See id.; see also
MULHERON, supra note 7, at 63-66 (discussing class actions in Canada).
57. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supranote 25 (considering the possibility of regulatory litigation in
the United States and Europe). The United States embraces both opt-out representative relief and aggregative
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (involving federal multi-district litigation (MDL)); FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.
Outside the United States, procedures range from other types of representative relief (such as that which is
available only on an opt-in basis, only with respect to certain substantive areas of law, only with respect to
injunctive relief and/or only at the instigation of an approved intermediary entity such as a government
association or non-government organization) to aggregate and settlement-only relief. See Hensler, supra note
53, at 8, 13-17 (discussing large-scale litigation in various jurisdictions around the world); see also Directorate
General for Internal Policies, Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in EU Member States,
IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-16, at 38 (July 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/
cont/201107/20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT24242EN.pdf (noting European Member States have adopted
four general types of collective redress: "group and representative actions, test case procedures and procedures
for skimming off profits").
58. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
130-45 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/
Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (disputing the "hybrid" character of the proceedings).
59. Id. 132.
60. See id 131 (discussing procedural approach to aggregated proceedings); see also Hensler, supra
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other hand, involve
in the final analysis, only one claim, albeit with many, or even a mass of
claims. The tribunal deals thus with one claim and can examine every aspect of
it specifically, through adversarial debate and scrutiny that guarantees to the
61
parties, particularly the respondent, all their due process rights.
The dissent disputed whether the claims acquired any characteristics typical of
representative relief because the dissent believed that the claims were not homogenous in
nature. 6 2 This was an issue of contention between the majority and the dissent, since the
majority found that the claims were sufficiently homogenous by distinguishing treaty
claims from contract claims, holding that the former-which were the claims at issue in
63
the arbitration-to be the same or substantially the same for all claimants.
The issue of homogeneity is not only important to the determination of whether the
claims were aggregative or representative, it may also be relevant to the question of
whether the majority's decision to allow the claims to go forward jointly was based solely
on the grounds of efficiency. 64 Certainly the majority enunciated a number of efficiencyoriented concerns in its award. For example, the majority stated that forcing Argentina
"to face 60,000 proceedings would be a much bigger challenge to Argentina's effective
defense rights than a mere limitation of its right to individual treatment of homogenous
claims in the present proceedings." 65 The majority also indicated that
not only would it be cost prohibitive for many Claimants to file individual
claims but it would also be practically impossible for ICSID to deal separately
with 60,000 individual arbitrations. Thus, the rejection of the admissibility of
the present claims may equal a denial of justice. This would be shocking given
that the investment at stake is protected under the BIT, which expressly

note 53, at 16-17 (discussing procedure for aggregating mass claims).
134-35 (Abi-Saab, dissenting); see also Hensler, supra note
61. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
53, at 14 (discussing procedure for representative class actions).
62. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, NJ 139-45 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (discussing nonhomogeneity of claims). Thus the dissent stated that
the majority award sets aside all the specificities of the claims concerning the security entitlements
(price, date of purchase, place of purchase, in which currency, applicable law, chosen forum, etc.)
as characteristics relevant only to the contractual rights of their holders, i.e., to contract claims;
while what counts here, according to the majority award, are the treaty claims, which are
homogenous . . . . But . . . how can the Tribunal for example evaluate a treaty claim for

compensating damages caused to an asset, without knowing (or while making abstraction of) the
time the asset was acquired, the price paid for it and the currency of denomination?
Id.

142-44.
63. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, % 316-26, 537, 545 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf (discussing contract claims and treaty claims); Abaclat, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, -n 142-44 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (discussing homogeneity in the majority's decision).
64. The extent to which the award reflects efficiency and other non-regulatory concerns is discussed by
the author elsewhere. See Strong, Abaclat, supra note 8 (manuscript at 9-15) (discussing rationales supporting
large-scale arbitration).
65. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 545.
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provides for ICSID jurisdiction and arbitration. 6 6
As a result of these factors, the large number of claimants "makes it de facto
impossible to deal with all them seriatim," thus requiring mass proceedings in the minds
of the majority. 67
Although "procedural efficiency has been increasingly advocated by scholarly
writers and taken into account in practice by arbitral tribunals and courts" on the grounds
that parties intend their arbitration to proceed in a manner that is efficient, there is still no
presumption in arbitration that parties have agreed to create the single most efficient
procedure possible. 68 Therefore, efficiency, standing alone, would not be sufficient to
justify the use of large-scale litigation techniques in Abaclat. However, class and
collective redress can be used not only as a means of promoting efficiency but also as a
means of promoting certain regulatory ends. 69 Thus, it is necessary to identify the
constituent elements of regulatory litigation and arbitration so as to determine whether
Abaclat falls within any sort of permissible regulatory paradigm.
II. REGULATORY LITIGATION

A. Regulatory LitigationDefined
The author has recently analyzed regulatory litigation in depth in a companion
article, so the current discussion will move swiftly through the basic parameters of the
device rather than rehearsing the entirety of the debate about the propriety of the device
as a general proposition. 70 Although several different types of regulatory litigation
exist, 7 1 the version that is at issue here involves situations where private individuals fill
certain gaps in the relevant regulatory regime by using a "legal remedy or the settlement
equivalent in order to influence future, risk-producing behaviors." 72 While some question
exists as to whether class relief, standing alone, qualifies as a remedy sufficient to satisfy
this standard, the combination of large-scale legal relief with other elements typical of
66. Id. 537; see also Ilija Mitrev Penusliski, A Dispute Systems Design Diagnosis of ICSID, in THE
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 507, 524-26 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (outlining
average costs of an ICSID arbitration).
67. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 665.
68. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization ofArbitralProcedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313,
1321-22 (2003); see also JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
16-92 (2003) (suggesting multiparty arbitration may be appropriate if "it serves procedural
ARBITRATION
economy"); EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 476 (1999).
69. See MULHERON, supra note 7, at 63-66 (distinguishing regulatory from non-regulatory class relief);
Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 59) (discussing various rationales supporting the
use of regulatory litigation).
70. See generally Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (setting forth a detailed analysis of
regulatory litigation).
71. See Buxbaum, Securities, supranote 29, at 41-67 (discussing transnational regulatory litigation in the
securities field); Hannah L. Buxbaum, TransnationalRegulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 257-72
(2006) [hereinafler Buxbaum, Transnational)(discussing transnational regulatory litigation in various economic
contexts); Bayer, supra note 22 (discussing regulatory litigation involving public actors); Luff, supra note 21, at
113-14 (distinguishing top-down from bottom-up regulatory litigation); Meyer, supra note 22 (discussing
regulatory litigation involving public actors).
72. Luff, supra note 21, at 113; see also Buxbaum, Securities,supranote 29, at 75.
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U.S. class actions and the traditional types of legal remedies (damages, injunctive relief,
and declaratory relief) satisfies the requirement of a legal remedy under this test.73
Private forms of regulatory litigation are admittedly controversial, both inside and
outside the United States, 7 4 since they fly in the face of the "received tradition" that "the
lawsuit is a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private rights." 75
Regulatory litigation also challenges the notion that "regulatory gaps" constitute "policy
decisions on the part of agencies and the legislature" and that "decisions on the
appropriate scope of regulatory protection" should "be left to these politically
accountable actors." 76
Although these concerns have considerable support within the legal community,
proponents of regulatory litigation take the view that private forms of regulation are
necessary as a means of addressing risks that cannot be anticipated in advance and that
therefore cannot be addressed legislatively or administratively.77 Thus, it has been said
that "[t]he aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
govemment." 7 8
Regulatory litigation does not attempt to replace or contradict more formal means of
regulation. 79 Instead, regulatory litigation supplements traditional forms of regulation in
certain limited circumstances as a function of need.80 Therefore, when determining

73. See DAN B. DOBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES 337-41 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing class relief); Strong,
Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 28) (analyzing use of class procedures as a remedial
measure); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 2-3 (discussing how background principles of U.S. law increase
regulatory effect of class actions).
74. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (noting that bottom-up regulatory litigation is especially
controversial).
75. Abram Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976);
see also Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: ProceduralMeans of ObtainingSubstance, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 575, 576-77 (1997); Luff, supra note 21, at 101.
76. Luff, supra note 21, at 113.
77. See id. at 75 (noting regulatory litigation focuses on "latent social risk"). The problems of
unanticipated regulatory issues are readily apparent in the context of the recent financial crisis. For example, as
one commentator noted in a discussion about the propriety of creating more federal agencies to regulate the
financial sector:
Identifying unanticipated risk is hard and there is no reason to think that the same busy federal
officials, who apparently overlooked these risks in 2006 and 2007, will become more prescient
simply because they serve together on an elite Council. The presence of the one independent expert
is helpful, but there was no lack of experts in the late 2000s who warned of an impending financial
collapse. There were also some savvy investors and economists who anticipated the collapse, but
the financial regulators and the US intelligence community apparently took no notice of that.
Steve Chamovitz, Addressing Government FailureThrough InternationalFinancialLaw, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L.
743, 748 (2010) (internal citation omitted).
78. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (noting also that "[w]here it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits
for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action
device").
79. See Glover, supra note 20, at 1137 (stating that private regulatory litigation and the mechanisms that
enable it are not fundamentally at odds with a public law regime).
80. See id (explaining that private litigation is an integral part of the modern administrative state);
Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 502 (noting that states may allow large-scale, potentially
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whether regulatory litigation is appropriate in any particular circumstance, commentators
specifically consider issues such as the availability of other methods of behavior
modification, the likelihood of industry regulation, and the effect a class suit is likely to
have on actual or potential defendants. 8 1
Framing regulatory litigation as a risk regulator allows use of a three-prong test to
ascertain whether a particular remedy (including remedies involving large-scale litigation
techniques or the settlement equivalent) 82 behaves in a regulatory manner.83 This test
requires the presence of: (1) intent, meaning "not only the desire to influence behavior as
the conscious object of the one who would regulate, but also the desire to prevent some
future, risk-producing behavior;" (2) a pre-existing substantive norm which is to be
enforced by "the litigant, the judge, or the two acting in concert," who "intend to produce
some action on the part of the target of regulation because of the risk (and the litigant's or
judge's apprehension of the risk) that the target actor's future behavior will fall short of
the relevant norm;" and (3) a rule, typically in the form of a remedy, "that expresses the
norm to the world and attempts to limit the threats (risk) to that norm." 84
Each of these elements is subject to further definition and debate. 85 One key area of
disagreement relates to whether a conscious intent to regulate is necessary or whether a
regulatory effect is sufficient. 86 Other differences of opinion arise over the necessary
extent of the regulatory effect, with some commentators suggesting that the effect must
be felt by an entire industry while others believe that only the individual defendant needs
to be affected. 87 Some of these issues can become quite important in cases where
regulatory litigation techniques are brought into the arbitral realm. 88
B. TransnationalRegulatory Litigation
U.S.-trained lawyers tend to accept the principles of regulatory litigation more
readily than lawyers from other jurisdictions, since the concept of litigation-as-regulation

regulatory claims to be brought only in limited subject matter areas); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supranote
25 (explaining that litigation is a necessary form of regulation in certain legal systems). "Need" was specifically
mentioned as a rationale for mass proceedings in Abaclat. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 484 (Aug. 4, 2011),
available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf (citing "need" as a rationale for
mass proceedings).
81. These queries help determine whether the regulatory gap is intentional or unintentional. See
MULHERON, supra note 7, at 248-52 (discussing the possibility of unintended regulatory effects). Other criteria
can also be used, though they are not discussed herein. See Glover, supranote 20, at 1153-55 (discussing other
circumstances where regulatory litigation might be appropriate); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25
(manuscript at 54) (discussing various instances where regulatory litigation might be necessary).
82. See Hensler, supra note 53, at 19-20 (noting that most large-scale disputes settle, regardless of
whether they are brought as a representative or aggregative action).
83. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14.
84. Id.
85. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 28).
86. See id. (defining intent as the desire to prevent or influence future behavior); see also infra notes 288324 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of regulatory intent).
87. See Luff, supranote 21 (discussing scope of regulatory effect); see also MULHERON, supra note 7, at
64; Strong, Canada,supranote 30, at 967-70; Strong, RegulatoryLitigation,supra note 25.
88. See infra notes 288-324 and accompanying text (discussing intent in arbitral context).
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is so deeply embedded in the American legal psyche. 8 9 However, even those who are
comfortable with the use of regulatory litigation in domestic legal systems recognize the
significant problems that can arise when the mechanism is brought into the international
arena.
Debates about the propriety of regulatory litigation in the domestic context focus on
issues of institutional design within a single, closed legal system. 90 While questions may
exist about the "efficiency and appropriateness" of regulatory litigation and "whether it is
sensible to combine compensation with regulation," 9 1 the analysis is limited to the roles,
duties, and intentions of a single judiciary, legislature, and executive who work together
to provide a sensible and cohesive regulatory regime.
Transnational regulatory litigation, on the other hand, exists in an environment
where "no formal political state has authority of a scope commensurate with modem
global business." 92 While traditional means of regulation do exist in the international
realm, enacting authorities typically operate only on a sectoral basis and do not (or
cannot) always provide an efficient, predictable, and legally enforceable means of
regulating the relevant behavior. 93 Furthermore, "[g]lobal regulation typically does not
operate on two distinct, vertically separated levels, international and domestic. Rather, it
functions through a web of interactions and influences, horizontal, vertical, and diagonal,
among a diverse multiplicity of different regimes and actors, resembling nothing so much
as a Jackson Pollock painting." 94
The absence of a single regulatory body with worldwide authority can lead to a
variety of problems in cases involving cross-border harm. For example, lack of
coordination between different national systems can result in regulatory gaps (which
leads to under-deterrence of the harmful behavior), 95 regulatory duplication (which leads
to over-deterrence of what could include socially beneficial behavior), and regulatory
inconsistency (which leads to parties being made subject to different obligations under
multiple applicable standards). 96 Public regulators can also find it difficult to respond

89. See Luff, supra note 21, at 81 (discussing the prominence of regulatory lawsuits in the U.S.); see also
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 22-51 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (discussing regulation through litigation
using case studies regarding tobacco); ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 16-35 (2009)
(noting the "regulator's dilemma").
90. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 77) (discussing the combination of
public and private regulation in the United States).
91. Christopher Hodges, Europeanizationof Civil Justice: Trends and Issues, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 96, 121
(2007).
92. Nagareda, supra note 23, at 13.
93. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 699-703 (describing "the vast increase in" and nature of transnational
regulation).
94. Id. at 703; see also Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 15, at 10-11 (discussing complexities of global
administrative law).
95. This scenario may be most readily seen in the context of antitrust or competition law, in that
developing countries without robust antitrust or competition law regimes "may leave anti-competitive conduct
entirely unregulated," thus requiring other countries to step in so as to "ensure better regulation of markets
everywhere." Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 71, at 261. However, problems with comparative underregulation can also arise in other fields, such as those involving securities, pharmaceuticals, or the environment.
See id. at 261, 263, 310 (explaining problems with under-regulation in various contexts).
96. See id. at 261 (discussing problems with regulatory inconsistency in the international context); Alan
Devlin, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits ofEconomics, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 253, 267-68 (2010) (discussing
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rapidly to threats of international legal harm, even though the pace and integrated nature
of modem globalized society means that developments in one jurisdiction can have a
nearly instantaneous knock-on effect elsewhere in the world. 97 Thus, "international
regulations, if any, may not come as quickly as the urgency of problems would
demand." 98 These factors suggest that there may be an even higher need for regulatory
litigation in the transnational context than in the national one. 99 However, the device still
must be properly defined and delimited, a task which can be quite difficult given that
international disputes do not arise in a closed legal system governed by a single judicial,
legislative, and executive authority.
The structural dissimilarities between the national and international legal orders
suggest that it may be inappropriate or impossible to transfer the kind of institutional
design analysis that is used in cases involving domestic disputes to issues arising in the
international realm. 100 However, it is likely that some of the concerns about regulatory
litigation that have been enunciated at the national level will be made at the international
level as well. For example, questions will doubtless arise as to whether private litigation
constitutes an appropriate means of addressing public concerns 10 and whether regulatory
silence should be construed as an unintended gap or a conscious policy decision on the
part of the relevant political actors. 102 These matters are discussed elsewhere and will not
be addressed herein. 103 Instead, the focus of this analysis is on those issues that relate
directly to transnational regulatory litigation. 104
inconsistent actions taken by the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Commission with respect to
Microsoft as well as the proposed merger between Honeywell and General Electric); William E. Kovacic, The
Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 MICH. L. REv. 1019, 1036 n.67 (2012)
(reviewing and examining DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
(2011)); Stewart, supra note 15, at 695 (discussing diversity of regulatory regimes in national and international
contexts).
97. See Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GA TT System After Sixty-Five Years: A BalanceSheet of
Success and Failure,47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 31, 43 (2008) ("We have developed a highly sophisticated,
24-hour-day global capital market, which facilitates instantaneous transfers of funds on a scale that the
'founding fathers' could not have imagined.").
98. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the
G20, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 491, 494 (2012).
99. Need is often the driving force behind the development of regulatory litigation. See supranotes 77-80
and accompanying text (explaining that aggregation of claims evolved from the need to regulate behavior
unaddressed under standard regulatory approaches).
100. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supranote 25 (manuscript at 4) (explaining that cross-border class
actions create certain unique regulatory and procedural problems); see also supra note 46 and accompanying
text (discussing institutional design issues in investment regime).
101. See Chayes, supra note 75 (explaining that litigation is traditionally envisaged as disputes between
private parties about private concerns); Greenberg, supra note 75 (discussing use of class actions for public
purposes); Luff, supra note 21, at 101 (questioning whether the traditional lawsuit was indeed a vehicle for
settling private rights through private parties).
102. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (explaining controversies relating to use of regulatory litigation).
103. See, e.g., Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 16-17) (citing Coffee, supra
note 22) (discussing whether private litigation is appropriate for public matters and whether regulator silence is
intentional).
104. See generally Hensler, FUTURE, supra note 30, at 250-55; S.I. Strong, Collective Redress in the
Cross-Border Context: Litigation, Arbitration, Settlement and Beyond, in 2 THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE
FUTURE OF THE LAW (Sam Muller et al. eds., forthcoming 2012) (exploring the issues and problems raised by
globalization in the legal world).
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Some concerns relate to economic matters. Thus, for example, some commentators
have suggested that "where the economic markets for particular products are not
separable along geographic lines, regulatory efforts too must be directed as a more
broadly defined market." 105 Indeed, the failure to coordinate regulatory activity across
national boundaries can lead to significant economic ramifications for both individuals
and society as a whole. 106
Other problems arise as a matter of civil procedure. 10 7 Numerous issues can arise in
this regard, including those related to locating a court with jurisdiction over all interested
persons, obtaining extraterritorial application of domestic laws, and/or achieving
international enforcement of judgments.10 8 While these difficulties exist in any type of
international litigation, they are exacerbated in regulatory litigation given the potential for
cross-border regulatory mismatches concerning the propriety of regulatory litigation as a
matter of institutional design. 109
Cases involving class or collective relief are particularly tricky, since there is often a
procedural mismatch in addition to a regulatory one.1 10 Thus, for example, parties
seeking to assert global class actions in U.S. courts have experienced significant
problems as a result of U.S. courts' standard use of opt-out mechanisms, since some
countries view opt-out procedures as constitutionally suspect and will not enforce a

105. Buxbaum, Transnational,supra note 71, at 260; see id. at 297-305; see also Nagareda,supra note 23,
at 13 (explaining that the global economy creates difficulties in dealing with global disputes using domestic
courts).
106. See Alberto Cassone & Giovanni B. Ramello, The Simple Economics of Class Action: Private
Provision of Club and Public Goods, 32 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 205, 209-12, 222-23 (2011) (explaining
consequences of failure to coordinate global regulation); Giovanni B. Ramello, Aggregate Litigation and
Regulatory Innovation: Another View of Judicial Efficiency, 32 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 63, 64 (2012) (noting
asbestos litigation "attract[ed] the attention of regulators and trigger[ed] regulatory change," with "[t]he
consequences extend[ing] beyond the borders of the US, with other countries implementing similar regulatory
regimes in their own national systems"); see also supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing
regulatory gaps, regulatory duplication, and regulatory inconsistency).
107. Interestingly, this appears to be the most common analytical paradigm for issues relating to
transnational regulatory litigation. See supra note 29 (listing sources using this analytical approach).
108. See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 18-67 (discussing jurisdictional issues in multinational
class actions); Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 71, at 272-93 (discussing "[t]he application of
jurisdictional rules in transnational regulatory cases"); Jodie A. Kirschner, Why Is the US. Abdicating the
Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritorialism,Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort
Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 259, 260 (2012) (noting the United States is moving away from a broad

acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdiction); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 19-41 (discussing these issues in regard
to international class actions); Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39 (discussing jurisdictional issues in the field of
mass torts); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation After Morrison:
Correcting the Supreme Court's "Transactional Test", 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 443 (2012) (discussing the

current system of international securities litigation and problems that can arise in determining the governing law
in international disputes).
109. See Nagareda, supra note 23, at 13 (discussing regulatory mismatches); see also Buxbaum,
Transnational,supra note 71, at 297-305 (discussing conflict of laws concerns in transnational regulatory

litigation).
110. The increasing availability of class and collective relief in domestic legal systems has increased the
likelihood of procedural discrepancies between the way different national systems handle large-scale litigation.
See supra note 57 (describing the wide range of approaches to large-scale litigation in different national courts);
see also EXTRATERRITORIALYTY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012).
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judgment if a plaintiff did not affirmatively opt into the lawsuit. 111 Other difficulties arise
simply as a matter of size, as when the sheer number of parties makes it impossible to
identify a court with jurisdiction over all interested individuals. 112
However, the biggest challenges facing transnational regulatory litigation arise as a
matter of regulatory law and policy. This is because courts have traditionally
"consider[ed] markets separately, and view[ed] their role as protecting conditions only
within" their own jurisdiction.1 13 While this approach may be consistent with
longstanding jurisprudential principles about the power of the territorial state, 114 it is
problematic in a contemporary legal environment involving highly integrated global
markets and internationally fluid societies. 115
Some states have shown an increased willingness to consider transnational
regulatory litigation so as to avoid problems associated with a rigidly isolationist
approach. 116 However, these efforts create their own unique set of concerns. 117

111. See In re Vivendi Universal, No. 02 Civ. 5571, 2009 WL 855799, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009)
(explaining that France currently does not have class-action litigation or an opt-in policy, and noting concerns
about the constitutionality of these procedures); Rachael Mutheron, The Casefor an Opt-Out Class Action for
European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 426-27 (2009)
(explaining that "while the opt-out approach is not common in Europe, it has existed in some version for over a
decade, and has been adopted with some recent momentum"); Monestier, supra note 29, at 44-45 (discussing
Europe's general aversion to U.S.-style class actions); Wasserman, supra note 29, at 332-69 (discussing the
preclusive effect of group litigation in European jurisdictions). Although concerns regarding the international
enforceability of a class award may seem to relate only to the tail end of a dispute, the issue actually arises very
early on, since many U.S. judges take future enforceability into account during certification proceedings and
will not allow an international class to go forward if the defendant cannot be assured that any resulting
judgment will be given preclusive effect in other jurisdictions. See Monestier, supra note 29, at 7, 10-13, 31
(discussing how issues relating to international enforcement arise); Wasserman, supra note 29, at 379-80
(describing concerns about the res judicata effect of U.S. class judgments outside the United States).
112. See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 37, 62 (discussing procedural difficulties associated with
global class actions); Buxbaum, Transnational,supra note 71, at 268 (discussing issues relating to global class
actions).
113. Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 71, at 282; see also Nagareda,supra note 23, at 37 (discussing
need for international remedies to global injuries); Stewart, supra note 15, at 697 (discussing issues relating to
global regulation). As the Second Circuit stated recently:
[F]oreign companies are creatures of other states. They are subject to corporate governance and
government regulation at home. They are often engines of their national economies, sustaining
employees, pensioners and creditors-and paying taxes ... .American courts and lawyers [do not]
have the power to bring to court transnational corporations of other countries, to inquire into their
operations in third countries, to regulate them-and to beggar them by rendering their assets into
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and (American) legal fees.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing claims under the Alien Tort
Claims Act).
114. See Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory:From Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to
Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 981, 981-82, 1013 (2009) (noting these views arose in the 16th and 17th
centuries).
115. See Hensler, FUTURE, supranote 30, at 250-55 (discussing the jurisdictional questions that may arise
as global markets more closely integrate); see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (referring to the
negative consequences and potential issues that may arise if there is a lack of cooperation among different
national systems).
116. These problems include regulatory gaps, regulatory duplication, and regulatory inconsistency. See
Nagareda, supra note 23, at 13 (defining regulatory mismatches); see also infra notes 127-28 and
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For example, national courts attempting to address a global regulatory injury can
experience difficulties with respect to the substantive law used to resolve the dispute. In
contrast to "[t]ransnational public law litigation[, which] takes place in the domestic
courts of a particular country," and applies "international law norms," 1l 8 transnational
regulatory litigation typically involves domestic courts applying domestic regulatory law
"for the benefit of the international community." 1 1 9 This can create considerable tension
on the foreign relations front, 120 since the laws in question often involve politically
sensitive issues such as those relating to economic policy. 121
Other problems relate to jurisdiction. For example, some state courts are loathe to
relinquish jurisdiction over their own citizens in cases where "the mandatory and
regulatory nature" of certain laws give rise to a "particularly strong" national interest in
enforcing those laws domestically. 122 Not only will some courts refuse to relinquish
jurisdiction over their own nationals, some judges may decline jurisdiction over foreign
nationals as an exercise of comity. 123 Although it is technically possible for courts to
address issues relating to substantive law by applying different national laws to different
subgroups of parties, that process can become so complicated as to destroy the superiority
of the class mechanism over other means of resolving the dispute. 124

accompanying text (discussing problems with transnational regulatory litigation).
117. See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 16-18 (referring to the various problems that can arise in
international regulatory litigation); Buxbaum, Transnational,supra note 71, at 253-56 (providing an overview
of the goals of transnational regulatory litigation); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 2-10 (discussing problems such
as "regulatory mismatches"); Strong, Regulatory Litigation,supranote 25 (discussing the possible ramifications
of regulatory mismatches).
118. Buxbaum, Transnational,supra note 71, at 257; see id. at 254-55 (discussing the consequences of
international regulatory litigation).
119. Id.at255.
120. See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 62 (discussing foreign policy implications of transnational
regulatory litigation); Buxbaum, Transnational,supra note 71, at 268-70 (discussing potential problems
relating to transnational regulatory litigation).
121. See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 71, at 255 (citing examples under U.S. antitrust law,
securities law, and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). This is assuming that
the forum state can find a means of applying national law extraterritorially. National legislatures typically do
not intend their laws to have extraterritorial effect, particularly in the politically sensitive realm of regulatory
law. See id. at 272, 296-97 (discussing limitations placed on the use of domestic law in international disputes);
see also Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14 (discussing the extraterritorial effect of global class actions);
Ventoruzzo, supranote 108, at 436 (discussing Congress' creation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982, which gives U.S. courts jurisdiction over certain conduct affecting domestic markets).
122. Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 37 (discussing the U.S. interest in enforcing its securities
laws); see also Kirschner, supra note 108 (discussing interest in extraterritorial application of domestic law);
Stefan Michael Kr6ll, The "Arbitrability" of Disputes Arising from Commercial Representation, in
ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 317, %

16-57 to 16-65 (Loukas A.

Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009) (suggesting courts are less inclined to enforce foreign forum
selection clauses than arbitration agreements because of concerns about the application of mandatory rules of
law). For example, U.S. courts may be disinclined to decline jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens in
cases where "the claims of U.S. nationals ...
strongly implicate local regulatory interests." Buxbaum,
Securities, supra note 29, at 37-38.
123. See George A. Bermann, U.S. Class Actions and the "Global Class", 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91,
94 (2009) (discussing U.S. courts' ability to exercise jurisdiction over foreign parties); Monestier, supra note
29, at 71 (discussing European courts' reluctance to adopt U.S.-style class actions).
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (only permitting class actions if they are superior to other available
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Up until this point, most of the practical and academic debate regarding
transnational regulatory litigation has focused on problems associated with global class
actions filed in U.S. courts. 12 5 However, the world of large-scale litigation has expanded
dramatically in the last ten years, with numerous nations having adopted their own
domestic forms of class and collective relief. 126 Some of these jurisdictions appear
amenable to taking on the challenges associated with transnational regulatory litigation,
particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court curtailed plaintiffs' ability to bring "foreigncubed" securities actions in the United States in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd. 127 Thus, for example, the Canadian case of Silver v. Imax Corp. has been heralded as
making "Ontario a new haven for secondary market class actions" involving shareholders
from around the world. 128 The Netherlands has also been touted as being capable of
addressing "f-cubed" securities actions as well as other global regulatory concerns, based
on the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements of 2005, which allows the creation of worldwide classes on an opt-out basis, albeit for settlement purposes only.1 29
methods of adjudication); Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 66-67 (discussing the difficulties that might
be present when creating global classes, such as conflicting domestic and foreign laws).
125. See Bermann, supra note 123, at 93-101 (outlining various unresolved problems with global class
actions); Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 35 (describing concerns regarding global class actions in U.S.
courts); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 11-12 (discussing regulatory mismatches); Choi & Silberman, supra note
29, at 465 (analyzing extraterritoriality issues in global securities class action lawsuits); Dixon, supranote 29, at
134 (discussing extraterritorial application of U.S. class action judgments); Monestier, supra note 29
(comparing aggregate litigation mechanisms in Europe and the U.S.); Mulheron, Vivendi, supra note 29, at
181-82 (discussing issues regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. class action judgments); Wasserman,
supranote 29, at 332-69 (providing a comparison of different large-scale litigation techniques and doctrines).
126. See THE ANNALS, supra note 26, at 10-11 (discussing 30 different national regimes); see also supra
note 57 and accompanying text (discussing different forms of large-scale litigation outside the United States).
127. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (discussing foreign-cubed
securities actions). An "f-cubed" (or "foreign-cubed") action involves "actions in which '(1) foreign plaintiffs
[are] suing (2) a foreign issuer in an American court for violations of American securities laws based on
securities transactions in (3) foreign countries."' Id. at 2895 n.11 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations and
emphasis omitted). Commentators have suggested that the United States, which once led the world in policing
the worldwide actions of multinational corporations, has retreated from that position in recent years. See
Kirschner, supra note 108, at 259-263 (noting European jurisdictions are primed to take the lead in policing
large-scale international abuses of human rights); Ventoruzzo, supra note 108, at 405 (discussing the limitations
on extraterritorial application of U.S. law after Morrison).
128. Mark Gelowitz, Court Certifies Class Action Against Imax: Liability May Be Coming Soon to a
Theatre Near You, LAW. WKLY. (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article
&articleid=l 103; Silver v. Imax Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5573 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); see also Silver v. Imax
Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5585 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (demonstrating a willingness to allow global class action
suits); Tanya Monestier, Is Canadathe New Shangri-La of Global Securities Class Actions?, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 305, 308 (2012) (noting Canada's willingness to address multinational securities disputes); Strong,
Canada,supranote 30, at 927 (discussing Canada's willingness to address multi-jurisdictional classes).
129. See Arjan de Boode & Allard Huizing, The Netherlands as an Alternative Forumfor Cross Border
Class Settlements and the Potential Consequences for Claims by "Foreign Cubed" Plaintiffs Under US
Securities Laws, GT ALERT (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events[Publications/Alerts/132898/
The-Netherlands-as-an-Altemative-Forum-for-Cross-Border-Class-Settlements-and-the-PotentialConsequences-for-Claims-by-Foreign-Cubed-Plaintiffs-under-US-Securities-Laws (discussing, inter alia, the
Shell and Vedior settlements, both confirmed by Dutch courts in mid-2009); lanika Tzankova & Daan Lunsingh
Scheurleer, The Netherlands, in THE ANNALS, supra note 26, at 149, 153-55 (discussing the Dutch Collective
Settlements Act). Interestingly, the European Union and its Member States may be taking a larger role in the
policing of multinational actors. See Kirschner, supra note 108, at 281 (discussing Dutch courts' willingness to
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As the number and type of mechanisms capable of providing class and collective
redress increase, so too do the difficulties associated with coordinating these various
actions internationally.1 30 Although public1 3 1 and private actors1 32 have both undertaken
efforts recently to deal with the difficulties of cross-border coordination, many of the
proposed solutions focus more on procedural issues (such as notice and the sharing of
evidence) than on regulatory concerns and are, in any event, persuasive rather than
binding.
Although there are now a large and ever-increasing number of jurisdictions that are
willing and able to address transnational regulatory issues through judicial means,
commentators are still concerned about "the role of individual legal regimes in regulating
global activity: to cast it in broad terms, concerns that an expansive assertion of
jurisdiction by ... [one nation's] courts plays in other countries as an instrument of
regulatory hegemony."' 33 This has led some experts to recognize that, "[u]nless and until
some mechanism is developed that assures the full participation of other countries in
crafting solutions to global economic [and other] misconduct, an aggressive
extraterritorial
approach to ...
[transnational regulatory concerns] remains
problematic."134

accept jurisdiction over international disputes).
130. See Ventoruzzo, supranote 108 at 413,443 (discussing problems with transnational litigation).
131. For example, the European Union adopted a resolution in February 2012 calling for the creation of a
coherent European approach to cross-border collective redress. See Resolution, of the European Parliament of 2
February 2012 on Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, P7 TA(2012)0021 (detailing
a suggested approach for developing a uniform collective redress system); S.I. Strong, Cross-BorderCollective
Redress in the European Union: Constitutional Rights in the Face of the Brussels I Regulation, 45 ARIz. ST.
L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4) (discussing pros and cons of proposed European-wide system of
cross-border collective redress).
132. For example, the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, the Canadian Bar
Association, and the International Bar Association have all adopted protocols regarding cross-border class and
collective lawsuits. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, PROTOCOL ON COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN
CANADA-U.S. CROSS-BORDER CLASS ACTIONS AND NOTICE PROTOCOL: COORDINATING NOTICE(S) TO THE
CLASS(ES) IN MULTI.URISDICTIONAL CLASS PROCEEDINGS (2011), available at http://www.cba.org/cbal
resolutions/pdf/11-03-A-bckd.pdf (proposing a notice protocol between U.S. and Canadian courts); AM. LAW
INST., GUIDELINES APPLICABLE TO COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER CASES (2000),
available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.calsupreme-court/practice and_procedure/practice-directionsand_
notices/General/Guidelines%20Cross-Border/ 20Cases.pdf (describing guidelines for communications in crossborder cases); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010) (describing
protocols for cross-border collective lawsuits); CAN. BAR Ass'N., CONSULTATION PAPER: CANADIAN JUDICIAL
PROTOCOL FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CLASS ACTIONS (June 2011), available at
http://www.cba.org/CBA/ClassActionsTaskForce/PDF/Consultation-eng.pdf (describing a formal framework
for multijurisdictional class action proceedings in Canada); INT'L BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR RECOGNISING
AND ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS (2008) (identifying proposed guidelines "for
the procedural and substantive rights to be afforded by a court issuing a collective redress judgment to the
persons it purports to bind"); Betsy M. Adeboyejo, Protocolsfor Cross-Border Cases ... Will They Work?,
ABA Now (Aug. 6, 2011), www.abanow.org/2011/08/protocols-for-cross-border-cases-%E2% 80%A6-willthey-work/ (discussing cross-border class action practice between the U.S. and Canada).
133. Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 63-64; see also Ventoruzzo, supra note 108, at 406-07
(expressing concerns about judicial overreaching).
134. Buxbaum, Securities, supranote 29, at 64. However, some commentators "point[] to the [continuing]
willingness of U.S. legislators to leverage the deterrent function of private actions under U.S. law for the benefit
of the global community," at least with respect to some issues. Buxbaum, Transnational,supra note 71, at 267-
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Because the "variance among state laws governing class procedures and among state
substantive laws often . .. renders the class device unable to effectuate private regulation
135
observers have called for "the
of widespread wrongdoing" across jurisdictional lines,
creation of new mechanisms, or the modification of existing mechanisms" so as to
"sufficiently regulate widespread harm, while also constraining the reach of such
1 36
A variety of potential
mechanisms so as to prevent the exportation of aberrant law."
solutions have been proposed.
Some experts, particularly those favoring new governance theory, suggest private
means of regulation (such as ombudsman schemes, third-party verification, and self37
While
regulation) that would eliminate the need for a single transnational regulator.'
useful in some regards, the various proposals do not provide a comprehensive solution to
the problem because they typically need to work in tandem with other regulatory
procedures.1 38
Other commentators focus on state consent as a means of overcoming the procedural
39
and regulatory problems associated with global class or collective actions.1 Although
this approach can involve litigation in the national courts of one or the other of the
parties,14 0 state consent can also result in arbitration, such as that proceeding under the
14
auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). 1 Indeed, the PCA already
administers a number of mass claims processes that were established through state
consent. 14 2 Although existing mass claims processes do not resolve all disputes at a
68.
135. Glover, supra note 20, at 1211.
136. Id.
137. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 520-63 (comparing traditional forms of governance theory
with new governance theory); Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model, 29 Civ.
JUST. Q. 370, 380-81 (2010) (describing various means of regulation in Europe); Christopher Hodges, From
Class Actions to Collective Redress: A Revolution in Approach to Compensation, 28 Civ. JUST. Q. 41, 54-55
(2009) (noting regulatory options in Europe); Samuel, supra note 23, at 653-54, 656-62.
138. See Samuel, supra note 23, at 680, 693 (noting injured parties may not know they have been harmed
in a self-regulatory and ombudsman schemes). For example, "self-regulation often lacks the teeth necessary to
attain its full potential. What is lacking . . . is the sanctioning mechanisms needed to ensure compliance with the
standards elaborated voluntarily by and within the industry." Daphnd Richemond-Barak, Regulating War: A
Taxonomy in Global Administrative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1027, 1068 (2011).
139. See Buxbaum, Transnational,supranote 71, at 267, 309-14 (suggesting state consent would "permit
courts to consider in a more balanced way the arguments presented for and against U.S. jurisdiction in
transnational regulatory cases"); see also Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 68 (contemplating state
consent as a means of overcoming problems with transnational regulatory litigation).
140. For example, the European Union, on behalf of itself and several Member States, agreed to U.S.
jurisdiction in a case seeking damages, equitable relief, and injunctive relief under RICO to deter certain acts
that could "facilitate organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and even terrorism." Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants
at 9, European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-7330, 02-7325), cert. granted,
vacated, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005); see also Buxbaum, Transnational,supra note 71, at 267, 309-14 (discussing

European Union's consent to exercise of U.S. jurisdiction).
141. See SI. Strong, Class and Collective Relief in the Cross-Border Context: A Possible Role for the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 2010, 113, 133-39 (2011) [hereinafter Strong, PCA]
(discussing state-to-state arbitration at the PCA).
142. See id. at 133-39 (noting the PCA has created "numerous mass claims commissions and tribunals
over the years"). The dissent in Abaclat drew certain parallels to the PCA's mass claims processes in its award,
although not everyone considers investment arbitration and mass claims processes to be similar in nature. See
Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
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single time, in a single forum, as do the procedures discussed in this Article, parties to a
PCA arbitration can agree to whatever dispute resolution format they choose and
therefore could create new class, mass or collective mechanisms similar to those under
discussion here. 143 Abaclat can also be seen as constituting a form of large-scale, stateapproved arbitration, although the dissent strongly objected to the notion that Argentina
had consented to any type of mass procedures. 144
A third possibility involves proceedings based on the consent of the parties. 14 5
While the consent in question could relate to mediation (leading perhaps to a global
settlement under the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements), 146 the more common form of
large-scale consent-based dispute resolution is arbitration. 14 7
IV. REGULATORY ARBITRATION

A. Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration
Arbitration has long been used to resolve a wide variety of large-scale disputes,

Admissibility, 1 176-89 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf; DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 202 ("At the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague, such procedures have been developed to deal with mass claims."); Strong, Mass Torts, supra note
39 (distinguishing Abaclat from mass claims processes at The Hague).
143. See Strong, PCA, supra note 141 ("[T]he PCA is well-known for being able to craft new dispute
resolution mechanisms."). Although many people view the PCA's mass claims processes as primarily dealing
with humanitarian conflicts and violations of public international law, the nature of the claims addressed by the
various tribunals and commissions include those sounding in contract, property, insurance, and personal injury,
thus suggesting that the PCA can address a wide variety of issues, including those of an economic or regulatory
nature, so long as the requisite state consent exists. See John R. Crook, Mass Claims Processes: Lessons
Learned over Twenty-Five Years, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES:
INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO UNIQUE CHALLENGES 41, 42-55 (Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2006)

(discussing various mass claim processes and related programs); Hans Das, The Concept of Mass Claims and
the Specificity of Mass Claims Resolution, in REDRESSING-INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES:
INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO UNIQUE CHALLENGES 3, 9 (Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2006) ("[Mlass

claims processes are very specific types of claims processes."). However, if parties wish to address human
rights or social justice concerns in a single mass proceeding, that is entirely possible, as the U.S. experience
with class actions shows. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 654-55, 658 (discussing how U.S. class actions
addressed social justice issues); see also Greenberg, supra note 75, at 585 (describing how class actions
afforded rights to individuals who might otherwise not have had a voice).
144. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 11 162-75, 190-91 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (claiming special
or secondary consent was required).
145. See Hensler, FUTURE, supra note 30, at 256-59 (describing use of private arbitration); Nagareda,
supra note 23, at 10 (suggesting arbitration "might seek to provide a degree of de facto global governance in
civil justice, though conceivably of a less transparent sort"); Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39 (discussing postdispute arbitration agreements in mass torts).
146. See Tzankova & Scheurleer, supranote 129 (describing the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements).
147. For example, only five cases have been brought under the Act on Collective Settlements, while over
300 class arbitrations have been filed with one arbitral institution alone. See Daan Lunsigh Scheurleer, Speech
at The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the
Humanities and Social Sciences Conference on Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context: Arbitration,
Litigation and Beyond-The Cross-Border Implications of the Dutch Collective Settlements Act: A
Practitioner's View (June 20-22, 2012); Class Arbitration Case Docket, AM. ARB. Ass'N, http://adr.org (select
"class arbitration case docket" under "services" tab) (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (listing over 300 class
arbitrations filed since 2003).
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including those of a regulatory nature. 14 8 While most large-scale arbitrations involve
domestic disputes, the procedures are equally suitable for use in international matters. 149
There are three types of large-scale arbitrations currently in use. The first arose in
the early 1980s in the United States and is known alternatively as "class arbitration,"
"class action arbitration," or "classwide arbitration." 1 50 Although class arbitration has
suffered certain setbacks in the United States in the last few years as a result of several
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the device remains a viable means of resolving
certain types of large-scale disputes, with a number of class arbitrations known to have
been filed even after the Supreme Court rulings. 15 1 Several other countries, including
Canada and Colombia, have contemplated the adoption of class arbitration in domestic
disputes. 152 Over 300 known class arbitrations have been filed since 2003 with one
148. Class arbitrations in the United States have resolved claims involving consumer, employment,
healthcare, franchising, financial services, commercial, maritime, and antitrust law since the early 1980s. See
Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208-09 (Cal. 1982) (holding that courts had the authority to order
classwide arbitration), rev'don other grounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Brief
of American Arbitration Association (AAA) as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 22-24,
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198) (noting 37% of all class
arbitrations administered by the AAA since 2003 involved consumer actions, 34% involved employment
actions, 7% involved franchising, 7% involved healthcare, 3% involved financial services, and 11% involved
other business-to-business concerns); Class Arbitration Case Docket, supra note 147 (listing class arbitrations
since 2003); Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigmof Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral Power
and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 301 (2004) (noting that arbitration is used in various
contexts); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variationsand Alternatives to
American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 407 (2002) (discussing the use of class actions in different
contexts); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 525 (noting that class arbitration can be used in a
number of subject matter areas).
149. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (involving an international
antitrust dispute in the maritime context); Harvard College v. JSC Surgutneflegaz, No. 04 Civ. 6069, 2007 WL
3019234, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007) (confirming international class arbitration award).
150. See Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209-10 (holding class arbitration an acceptable means of resolving largescale disputes); Gary Bom & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A
Tragedy of Errors,2012 J. DIsp. RESOL. 21, 21 (2012) (discussing history of U.S. class arbitration).
151. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (enforcing waiver of
class arbitration); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1175 (2010) (addressing
issues of contractual silence or ambiguity concerning class procedures in arbitration); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers
Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012) (noting the continued viability of
class arbitration); see also S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration "Change the Nature" of Arbitration?
Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 226-29 (2012)
[hereinafter Strong, First Principles](discussing the future of class arbitration in the wake of Stolt-Nielsen and
AT&T Mobility); S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. ArbitratorsCreatingInternationallyEnforceable
Awards When OrderingClass Arbitration in Cases of ContractualSilence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1017, 1021 (2009) [hereinafter Strong, Sounds of Silence] (defining international class arbitration); Gregory A.
Litt, Speech at The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and Netherlands Institute for Advanced
Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences Conference on Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context:
Arbitration, Litigation and Beyond-The United States Class Arbitration Experience (June 20-22, 2012)
(providing empirical data showing class arbitration filings with the American Arbitration Association through
2012).
152.

See MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMM'N, MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND CONSUMER

CLASS PROCEEDINGS 3-4, 22-23 (April 2008); Valencia v. Bancolombia (Colom. v. Colom.), (Bogotl Chamber
of Comm. 2003), digest by Jaramillo for Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA), available at
kluwerarbitration.com; Kuck & Litt, supra note 9, at 720-23 (discussing Colombia's use of class arbitration);
Strong, Canada, supra note 30, at 961-64 (discussing possible development of class arbitration in Canada);
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arbitral institution alone, with other disputes being heard ad hoc or under the auspices of
other arbitral organizations. 153
Procedurally, class arbitration reflects a strong bias toward U.S. conceptions of
collective justice, since the device adopts procedures that are largely reminiscent of those
used in judicial class actions. 154 Although judicial and arbitral forms of class relief are
not identical, 155 class arbitration appears to include a regulatory element similar to that
found in judicial class actions. 156 Interestingly, recent efforts by corporate parties to limit
or eliminate the class remedy in both litigation and arbitration through the use of
arbitration agreements and a concomitant waiver of class relief 1 57 may be destined to fail
Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 499-501 (discussing the adoption of class or collective
arbitration outside the United States).
153. See Class Arbitration CaseDocket, supra note 147.
154. A few adjustments have been made to take certain arbitration-related concerns into account. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 23 (governing class actions in federal court). See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N,
SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003), availableat www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (select
"search rules" under "rules & procedures" tab and search for "supplementing rules for class arbitrations")
[hereinafter AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES]; JAMS, JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2009), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures/; Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 494.
The similarities between the class arbitration rules and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
intentional, since the drafters of the arbitral rules wanted to provide courts and arbitrators with the opportunity
of relying on existing judicial precedents when construing the arbitral rules. See Meredith W. Nissen, Class
Action Arbitrations:AAA vs. JAMS: Different Approaches to a New Concept, 11 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 19, 19-21
(2005) (discussing the adoption of AAA and JAMS rules on class arbitration). It is unclear whether and to what
extent non-rule-based forms of class arbitration (the so-called "hybrid" form of class arbitration, a term that predated Abaclat) are still available in the United States. See Buckner, supra note 148 (claiming the hybrid model
has been "swept away").
155. Interestingly, class arbitration offers some unique benefits that suggest parties (particularly
respondents) should prefer class arbitration to class litigation. A full discussion of these benefits is beyond the
scope of this Article, but further reading is available. See Dana H. Freyer & Gregory A. Litt, Desirability of
InternationalClass Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 171, 171-81 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008) (discussing pros and cons
of class arbitration); Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 199,
210-12 (2004) (critiquing class arbitration); Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39 (discussing the benefits of class
arbitration); Strong, PCA, supra note 141, at 115-33 (comparing large-scale litigation and arbitration).
156. See Strong, Canada,supra note 30, at 969-71 (suggesting that regulatory issues should be considered
in the context of class arbitration).
157. The conventional wisdom is that corporate parties are routinely using class waivers found in
arbitration agreements as a means of eliminating all forms of class relief, although this assertion does not appear
to be substantiated by empirical evidence. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and
Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1139 (2011) (noting many arbitration agreements are silent as to class
treatment). While the extent to which these waivers are used may be subject to debate, what appears clear is that
they are not universally successful, since judges occasionally refuse to enforce the waiver and return the dispute
to the courts for possible class proceedings. See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2012)
(striking class waiver and holding arbitration agreement unenforceable); see also Seidel v. Telus Commc'ns,
Inc., [2011] I S.C.R. 531 IN 37, 39 (Binnie, J.) (Can.) (enforcing arbitration only as between parties). Should
the enforceability of class waivers become too unpredictable, corporate respondents may wish to make a choice
between class litigation and class arbitration. Given the various advantages of class arbitration over class
litigation, corporate respondents may decide to insert a provision into the arbitration agreement requiring class
claims to be brought in arbitration, as opposed to litigation. See supra note 155 (referencing articles discussing
class arbitration and the relative benefits). Corporate respondents could also seek class arbitration through a
compromis in cases where a class waiver has led to a potentially debilitating number of individual arbitrations
being brought. See Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
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in the long run as a result of certain regulatory concerns. 158
Class arbitration is not the only type of large-scale arbitral device currently
available. In the last few years, a second mechanism has developed: collective arbitration,
which involves either aggregative or opt-in representative procedures rather than
159
Collective
representative opt-out procedures, as are used in class arbitration.
160
in Spain in
arbitrations are found in the United States on a trans-substantive basis,
consumer actions, 16 1 and in Germany in shareholder actions.1 62 Other forms of collective
1740 (2011) (regarding use of class waivers); AT&T Sues Customers Seeking to Block T-Mobile Deal,
REUTERS, Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/17/us-tmobile-att-lawsuits-idUSTRE77G590
20110817 (discussing AT&T's surprise when approximately 1000 individual arbitration requests were filed by
customers after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the waiver of class proceedings in their arbitration agreements).
Although the concept of a compromis at one time seemed impossible because of concerns about the practical
feasibility of obtaining a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate on a classwide basis, such agreements now appear
possible. Compare Carolyn B. Lamm & Joceyln A. Aqua, Defining the Party--Who Is a ProperParty in an
InternationalArbitration Before the American Arbitration Association and Other InternationalInstitutions, 34
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 711, 717-18 (2002-03) (suggesting post-dispute arbitration agreements are
impossible in class disputes), with Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39 (suggesting post-dispute arbitration
agreements are possible in class disputes).
158. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory issues in class arbitration).
159. Some courts have allowed collective arbitration of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims despite a
prohibition of class arbitration under Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Arbitration Rules on the
grounds that
[a]lthough collective and class actions have much in common, there is a critically important
difference: collective actions are opt-in actions, i.e., each member of the class must take steps to
opt in to the action in order to participate in it, whereas class actions are opt-out actions, i.e., class
members automatically participate in a class action unless they take affirmative steps to opt out of
the class action. Collective actions bind only similarly situated plaintiffs who have affirmatively
consented to join the action.
Velez v. Perrin Holder & Davenport Capital Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 445, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Other courts
have differentiated between class and collective arbitration on the grounds that
[c]lass arbitration and the collective proceeding that the pilots have demanded here are so
fundamentally different that Stolt-Nielsen does not dictate the result. In the collective arbitration
sought here, unlike in a class arbitration, all of the affected pilots are actual parties. Further, in a
class proceeding, common issues need only "predominate" over issues that are unique to individual
members; identity of issues is not required. Here, there is only one straightforward question that
needs to be answered by the arbitration panel, and its disposition will equally affect each and every
pilot. Thus, because the type of proceeding demanded by the pilots is not, like a class proceeding,
so fundamentally different from an ordinary arbitration, we cannot, unlike the Supreme Court in
Stolt-Nielsen, definitively say that the parties did not agree to it.
JetBlue Airways Corp. v. Stephenson, 88 A.D.3d 567, 573-74 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (internal citations
omitted); see Jan-Krzyztof Dunin-Wasowicz, Collective Redress in InternationalArbitration: An American
Idea, a European Concept?, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 285, 321 (2011) (discussing various problems associated
with opt-in and opt-out procedures).
160. See Velez, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47 (allowing collective arbitration for labor and compensation
disputes); JetBlue Airways Corp., 88 A.D.3d at 573-74 (allowing collective arbitration for statutory claims);
Hensler, supra note 53, at 16 (describing the U.S. class action design features: "standing for private actors to
represent a class, trans-substantive application of the procedure, availability of money damages, and an opt-out
rather than an opt-in procedure for money damage class actions . . . ").
161. See Real Decreto-ley de 15 de febrero arts. 56-62 (B.O.E. 2008, 231); see also Laura Carballo
Pificiro, Speech at The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and Netherlands Institute for
Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences Conference on Collective Redress in the Cross-Border
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arbitration could also arise in the future. 163
Finally, a third type of large-scale arbitral proceedings-the "mass" arbitrationappears to be developing in the international investment arena as a result of Abaclat v.
Argentine Republic. 164 Although the majority award on jurisdiction indicated that it was
too early to determine the precise procedures to be used during the merits phase of the
proceeding, the panelists did set forth certain broad guidelines to assist the parties in
165
preparing for the next stage of the arbitration.
For example, the majority noted that "adaptions to hear the present case collectively
would concern not that much the object of the examination, but rather (i) the way the
Tribunal will conduct such examination, and/or (ii) the way Claimants are
represented." 1 66 Thus, with regard to the first factor, "the Tribunal would need to
1 67
implement mechanisms allowing a simplified verification of evidentiary material."
This simplified process might
concern either the depth of examination of a document (e.g., accepting a
scanned copy of an ID document instead of an original), or the number of
evidentiary documents to be examined, and if so their selection process (i.e.,
random selection of samples instead of a serial examination of each
document).1 68
The second procedural adjustment contemplated by the majority involved the
method by which claimants would be represented.1 69 Although the power granted by the
bondholders to TFA went "beyond the power granted to a normal agent under Rule 18
ICSID Arbitration Rules," that grant of authority had been "consciously accepted by
Claimants in order to benefit from the collective treatment of their claims before an
ICSID Tribunal." 1 70 Because the claimants had been sufficiently well-informed about the
Context: Arbitration, Litigation and Beyond-Collective Actions and Arbitration in Spain: Still Dealing with
Territoriality and Adequacy of Representation (June 20-22, 2012).
162. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 6, 2009, II ZR 255/08 (Ger.), available
at www.kluwerarbitration.com; DEUTSCHE INST. FUR SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT, Supplementary Rules for
Corporate Law Disputes, http://www.dis-arb.de/en/1 6/rules/dis-supplementary-rules-for-corporate-lawdisputes-09-srcold-idl5 (last visited Dec. 18, 2012); Christian Borris, Arbitrability of CorporateLaw Disputes
in Germany, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 55, 55-71 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al. eds., 2011) (discussing arbitration in
shareholder disputes, namely involving limited liability companies); S.I. Strong, Collective Arbitration Under
the DIS Supplementary Rules for CorporateLaw Disputes: A European Form of Class Arbitration?, 29 ASA
BULL. 45,47 (2011) [hereinafter Strong, DIS] (discussing collective arbitration in Germany).
163. See Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 494 (discussing how large-scale arbitration could
develop outside the United States). See generally CLASS ACTIONS AND ARBITRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

(Philippe Billiet et al. eds., 2012).
483, 488 (Aug.
164. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
(discussing the
4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf
development of a new form of mass arbitration).
165. See id. TT 530-31 (discussing the requirements that must be in place to permit large-scale procedures).
166. Id 530; see also id. 1531 (discussing the content of the examination).
167. Id 530.
168. Id. | 531.
169. See id TI 530-31.
170. Id $T 532, 546. Although some jurisdictions, most notably the United States, would find it
problematic to have what looks like a lead plaintiff acting without any sort of independent interest in the
dispute, a number of states permit or even require this type of procedural approach. See Hensler, supra note 53,
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consequences of their decision to waive their individual procedural rights, the majority
held that there was no difficulty in allowing TFA to act as claimants' representative, at
least as a matter of principle. 17 1
Of course, these sorts of procedural changes cannot be made without considering the
potential ramifications. In this case, the implications were twofold. First, the majority
recognized that it would "not be possible to treat each Claimant as if he/she was alone
and certain issues . .. will have to be examined collectively, i.e., as a group." 1 72 Second,
the new mass examination procedures
will likely limit certain of Claimants' and Argentina's procedural rights to the
extent that Claimants have to waive individual interests in favor of common
interests of the entire group of Claimants, while Argentina will not be able to
bring arguments in full length and detail concerning the individual situation of
each of the Claimants. 173
Normally, the parties' procedural rights could not be infringed upon in this way.
However, the majority considered the extent and type of limitations on the parties'
procedural rights in the context of the dispute as a whole and concluded that in these
particular circumstances
not only would it be cost prohibitive for many Claimants to file individual
claims but it would also be practically impossible for ICSID to deal separately
with 60,000 individual arbitrations. Thus, the rejection of the admissibility of
the present claims may equal a denial of justice. This would be shocking given
that the investment at stake is protected under the BIT, which expressly
17 4
provides for ICSID jurisdiction and arbitration.
The majority stated that the only time a group method of examination such as this
would be even remotely possible is when "claims raised by a multitude of claimants are
to be considered identical or at least sufficiently homogeneous." 1 75 The standard
contemplated in Abaclat is quite high, in that there must be "homogeneous rights of
compensation for a homogeneous damage caused to them by potential homogeneous
breaches by Argentina of homogeneous obligations provided for in the BIT." 176
When it came to specific procedures to be used in the merits hearing, the Abaclat
majority remained relatively vague, stating that it needed to know more about the facts of

at 14 (discussing the different parties who may have legal standing to bring representative litigation); Strong,
De-Americanization,supra note 43, at 503-04 (noting various jurisdictions permit or require a representative
entity to pursue large-scale claims); see also supranote 89 and accompanying text.
171. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 546; S.I. Strong, Cross-Border Collective Redress and
Individual ParticipatoryRights: Quo Vadis? (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Individual Participatory
Rights] (describing individual participatory rights). The majority noted, however, that Argentina could present
arguments about whether informed consent was in fact obtained from various individual claimants during the
merits phase of the proceedings. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 466 (noting the debate about the
legitimacy of consent in some individual cases).
172. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, T 536.
173. Id.
174. Id. T 537.
175. Id. 540.
176. Id 541.
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the case before it could decide how best to proceed.17 7 Therefore, although the award
discussed the possibility of a "sampling procedure," also known as a "bell weather
proceeding" or "pilot case procedure," it is unclear whether such mechanisms will
ultimately be used. 178
What is clear is that the merits hearing will be split into two phases. 179 The tribunal
will begin by establishing issues that go to the core of the case and the conditions that
need to be met to resolve the claims. 180 This first phase therefore has to identify which
issues or conditions are (1) general to all claimants, with the result that such issues or
conditions can be established once with regard to all claimants; (2) general to all
claimants, but including certain elements that might require the creation of subgroups of
claimants, with the result that those elements can perhaps be established through a
sampling procedure; and (3) specific to individual claimants, with the result that
individual case-by-case analysis will be necessary. 18 1
After the tribunal has determined the proper categories of issues or conditions raised
by the parties, it will then proceed to the second phase of the merits hearing. 182 This
stage will require additional procedural decisions as the tribunal determines how best to
address each of the various matters. 183
B. Regulatory Arbitrationin Practice
Given the number of large-scale arbitral proceedings that are now available for use
in domestic and international disputes, the question is whether and to what extent any or
all of these proceedings constitute a form of "regulatory arbitration." In disputes properly
construed as regulatory, the arbitral process would serve the same purpose as regulatory
litigation, acting not as "an ad hoc supplement to public law" but instead as an essential
element of a comprehensive regulatory regime. 184
The idea of regulatory arbitration is not entirely new, since Richard Nagareda
suggested as early as 2009 that arbitration might provide "a degree of de facto global
governance in civil justice, though conceivably of a less transparent sort" than
litigation. 185 However, the idea of arbitration as a means of transnational regulation has
only been raised intermittently in the intervening years. 186 This reticence may be due to a
number of factors, such as concern about the viability of class arbitration (which has been
the primary form of large-scale arbitration up until quite recently) in domestic disputes18 7
177. Id. 1 667 (stating that the tribunal should obtain an overview of the merits of the dispute before
deciding procedural issues).
178. See id. 666 (stating the tribunal contemplated the "possibility" of using such proceedings).
179. Seeid. 668.
180. See id. (describing procedure to be adopted).
181. See id 669 (describing procedure to be adopted).
182. Id. 668 (stating the second phase is dependent on the result of the first phase).
183. Id.
184. Glover, supra note 20, at 1137; see also Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (noting regulatory litigation fills
regulatory gaps).
185. Nagareda, supra note 23, at 10.
186. See Hensler, FUTURE, supra note 30 (discussing trends in resolution of large-scale disputes); Strong,
Canada,supranote 30, at 978-80 (discussing possible use of arbitration to resolve cross-border class claims).
187. The U.S. Supreme Court issued two key decisions on class arbitration shortly after Nagareda's article
was published. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (discussing waivers
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or the applicability of large-scale arbitral procedures to international matters. 188
Furthermore, the significant amount of controversy surrounding regulatory litigation in
both national and transnational contexts could give parties pause, since it suggests a
189
similar amount of difficulty will arise in situations involving regulatory arbitration.
In fact, it is highly likely that many of the objections raised in cases involving
regulatory litigation will also be brought in cases involving regulatory arbitration. 190
Those concerns, which focus primarily on issues of institutional design, are addressed by
the author in detail elsewhere and above, and will not be repeated herein. 19 1 Instead, the
focus in this section is on particular problems associated with the use of arbitration as a
regulatory device. While the discussion is comprehensive in its scope and includes
references to certain matters relating to contract-based arbitration, most of the issues
relate to contract- and treaty-based arbitration in equal measure. Some matters unique to
investment arbitration are also raised.
1. Concerns Relating to Arbitrability
The first and perhaps most obvious concern is whether the kinds of issues at stake in
regulatory arbitration are even arbitrable. 192 Although most states have become
increasingly amenable to arbitration over the last few decades, there are still some public

of class arbitration); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (discussing
contractual silence or ambiguity regarding class treatment); see also supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text
(discussing history of class arbitration in the U.S.).
188. Most commentators believe that class and collective arbitration are suitable for international disputes,
although there are some contrary views. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
1232 (2009) (stating class arbitration appears appropriate in international disputes); Alexander Blumrosen, The
Globalization of American Class Actions: International Enforcement of Class Action Arbitral Awards, in
MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CONSENT, PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT 355,

362 (Belinda Macmahon ed., 2009) (suggesting class arbitration is not appropriate in international disputes);
Kuck & Litt, supra note 9, at 728-36 (discussing the problem of international recognition and enforcement of
class arbitrations); Strong, Canada, supra note 30, at 941-43 (discussing the possibilities of class arbitration in
international disputes); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 494.(discussing possible spread of class
arbitration outside the U.S.); Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 151, at 1083-91 (discussing international
enforceability of class awards).
189. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (discussing difficulties with regulatory litigation in the United States);
Scott, supra note 14, at 664 (noting that significant questions arise as to the propriety of allowing states to
delegate regulatory authority to other actors, including non-state and supranational bodies).
190. Such concerns will revolve around issues such as the propriety of allowing private litigants to engage
in regulatory behavior through the bringing of legal claims. See generally Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra
note 25 (discussing contemporary issues in regulatory litigation); supra notes 89-146 (discussing various
regulatory concerns in the transnational context).
191. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (discussing institutional design issues); see also
Luff, supra note 21, at 101 (discussing regulatory litigation in the larger institutional context); Glover, supra
note 20, 1141-43 (discussing regulatory litigation design issues); Filippo Valguarnera, Legal Tradition as an
Obstacle: Europe's Difficult Journey to Class Action, 10 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 19 (2010) (discussing regulatory
issues in the U.S. and European Union).
192. This Article uses the terms "arbitrable" and "arbitrability" in their international sense to describe
which disputes can be heard in arbitration and which are reserved to the exclusive purview of the courts. See
Kr6ll, supra note 122, 16-7 (distinguishing two forms of arbitrability); see also United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, arts. 11(1),
V(2)(a) (discussing arbitrability in international proceedings).
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policy issues that are considered so sensitive that they may only be considered by
national courts. 193
Traditionally, arbitrability determinations have focused on the subject matter of the
dispute. 194 In this regard, regulation-by-arbitration should give rise to few, if any,
problems, since most areas of law that are subject to regulation have long been
considered arbitrable. 195 Thus, for example, the quintessential regulatory concernantitrust or competition law-has been arbitrable for years in both the United States and
the European Union, as well as in numerous other jurisdictions. 196 Securities disputes,
which involve another highly regulated field, are also arbitrable in a number of
countries. 197 Investment disputes are subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms of
numerous investment treaties, agreements, and laws.
However, recent developments in the United States suggest that class, mass, or
collective arbitration might be subject to a number of objections based on what could be
termed "procedural non-arbitrability."1 98 The principle of procedural non-arbitrability
would hold that certain procedures-as opposed to certain subject matter areas-are
deemed to be only appropriate in litigation, not arbitration. 199 The notion of procedural
non-arbitrability has not been raised outside the context of class, mass, or collective
arbitration because all of the seminal cases on arbitrability arose in the context of bilateral
or traditional multiparty disputes and therefore focused exclusively on issues of
substantive law. 200
The first objection based on procedural non-arbitrability focuses on the parties to the

193. See LEW ET AL., supra note 68,19-2 (referring to "objective arbitrability").
194. See id.
195. Gary Born has noted that "it is difficult to see what ... non-arbitrability objections could be raised to
class arbitrations" in the international context. BORN, supra note 188, at 1232 n.442.
196. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985)
(allowing antitrust matter to proceed in arbitration); Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton
Int'l NV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055 (allowing competition law matter to proceed in arbitration); In re Am. Express
Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 214-15 (2d Cir. 2012) (allowing antitrust claims to be brought in arbitration);
BORN, supra note 188, at 781-85 (discussing various regulatory concerns that are amenable to arbitration in the
United States and Europe); LEW ET AL., supra note 68, IM9-19 to 9-26, 9-42 to 9-47 (discussing arbitrability of
regulatory concerns).
197. See BORN, supra note 188, at 799-802 (discussing arbitrability of securities disputes in the United
States and Germany).
198. Not all class, mass, or collective proceedings are regulatory. See MULHERON, supra note 7, at 63-66
(distinguishing regulatory class actions from non-regulatory class actions).
199. Up until this point, the principle of arbitrablity has been defined as relating solely to subject matter
concerns. See LEW ET AL., supra note 68, 19-2 (discussing "objective arbitrability"). Notably, none of the U.S.
Supreme Court cases on class arbitration have raised the issue of arbitrability, possibly because a determination
that a particular procedure is non-arbitrable would mean that the issue should be returned to the courts, and the
class remedy is not a procedure that the Court wishes to protect. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (discussing use of waivers in class arbitration); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (discussing arbitration agreements that were silent or ambiguous as to
class treatment); Strong, First Principles,supra note 151, at 265 (stating that the Supreme Court intentionally
avoided mentioning arbitrability in Stolt-Nielsen because the dispute would have to be returned to court).
200. See LEW ET AL., supranote 68, J 9-1 to 9-98 (explaining what types of issues are arbitrable); Strong,
First Principles, supra note 151, at 212 (defining traditional multiparty proceedings as involving three to five
parties).
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dispute. Arbitration is a creature of contract, 20 1 and some commentators have construed
regulatory litigation and arbitration as either permitting or requiring an industry-wide
deterrent effect that could extend beyond the parties present in the arbitration. 202 Under
standard principles of arbitral law, arbitral tribunals cannot adjudicate the rights of nonsignatories to the arbitration agreement in question. 203
This issue was explicitly considered by the U.S. Supreme Court early on in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.204 The dispute there focused
on the argument that claims sounding in antitrust law were not arbitrable for a variety of
reasons, including the fact that the disposition of such claims could affect hundreds of
thousands, perhaps even millions, of third parties who had not signed the arbitration
agreement. 2 05 Although the dissent would have found such an argument persuasive, the
majority did not, thus allowing arbitration to be used in a variety of regulatory
contexts. 206 Similar arguments could be and have been raised in the investment context,
although they have been found to be equally unavailing. This suggests that some states
will not experience difficulties regarding regulatory arbitration's effect on nonsignatories, even in cases involving large-scale litigation techniques.
This outcome is not assured in all jurisdictions or with respect to all types of
regulatory relief For example, the Supreme Court of Canada recently considered whether
an arbitral tribunal was capable of entering an injunction in an arbitration where that
injunction might have an effect on third parties due to the class-oriented nature of the
claims in question. 20 7 While the Supreme Court of Canada denied the arbitrability of the
injunctive relief in that case based on a narrow interpretation of the statutes in question,
courts appear split about whether and to what extent an arbitral tribunal can order
injunctive relief in situations involving third party or public rights. 208
201. W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International
CommercialArbitration, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1995); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty
Dispute: The Searchfor Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 476 (1987).
202. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (defining regulatory effects).
203. See LEW ET AL., supranote 68, if 7-36 to 7-57 (discussing non-signatories in arbitration).
204. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624 (1985).
205. See id at 636-37 (holding that antitrust claims are arbitrable); id. at 655 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that antitrust claims can affect thousands, perhaps even millions, of people).
206. See id at 636-37 (allowing antitrust claims to proceed in arbitration).
207. See Seidel v. Telus Commc'ns Inc., [201111 S.C.R. 531, IT 55, 66, 85, 142, 146 (Can.) (considering
the effect of class-type claims in the face of an arbitration agreement); Strong, Canada,supra note 30, at 95152, 979-80 (discussing possibility of class arbitration in Canada). Injunctions are a key form of regulation,
given their forward-looking qualities. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (discussing criteria for regulatory
litigation); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 31) (discussing how injunctive relief
qualifies as regulatory litigation).
208. See Seidel, 1 S.C.R. 531,
55, 66, 85, 142, 146 (denying arbitrability of injunctive relief in
arbitration under specific legislation); Strong, Canada,supra note 30, at 951-52, 979-80 (discussing possibility
of class arbitration in Canada). At one point, California had prohibited the arbitration of issues relating to public
injunctive relief, but that provision has not survived AT&T Mobility. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (discussing waivers in the context of class arbitration); Kilgore v. Keybank, Nat'l
Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (abrogating the Broughton-Cruz rule), reh'ggranted,697 F.3d 1191
(9th Cir. 2012). This suggests that arbitrators in California now have an expanded ability to engage in
regulatory arbitration involving injunctive relief. Notably, investment tribunals have the power to order nonpecuniary relief, including injunctions, although they seldom do so. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at
349.
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A second potential problem relating to procedural non-arbitrability arises out of
concerns that class, mass, or collective arbitration somehow "changes the nature of
arbitration," either because of the size of the dispute or the complexity of the procedures
used to resolve the matter.2 09 While every procedure must be analyzed on its own
terms, 2 10 it would appear that this sort of argument is unavailing in the context of U.S.
class arbitrations, since the only aspects of class arbitration that are distinguishable from
bilateral or traditional multilateral arbitration are (1) the provision of relief on an opt-out
representative basis (a situation that will not arise in cases involving mass or collective
arbitration) 2 1 1 and (2) the underlying policy considerations, which include a heightened
regard for access to justice for parties with low-value claims and the creation of a
financial disincentive for corporations to engage in risky or socially unacceptable
behavior. 2 12 The second of these policy rationales-creation of a financial disincentiveis obviously deterrent and therefore regulatory. 213 However, neither of these issues
appears sufficient to bring class arbitration out of the definition of arbitration per se. 2 14
Therefore, it cannot be said that the class form of regulatory arbitration "changes the
nature of arbitration." 215
A third problem relating to procedural non-arbitrability involves questions of
consent. There has been a great deal of debate in the United States as to whether class
arbitration requires the parties' express consent to class proceedings or whether implicit
consent is sufficient. 2 16 A similar issue appears to be developing in the investment arena,
based on certain statements in and about Abaclat.2 17 Setting aside the fact that no other
209. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010); see also AT&T
Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing Stolt-Nielsen); Strong, First Principles, supra note 151, at 201-71
(analyzing whether class arbitration constitutes a type of arbitration).
210. There are significant differences between class, mass, and collective arbitration. See S.I. STRONG,
CLASS, MASS AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013);

see also supra notes 147-82 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text (explaining that collective arbitrations involve opt-in
procedures and class arbitrations involve opt-out procedures).
212. See Strong, First Principles, supra note 151, at 235-41 (discussing policy considerations in class
arbitration and traditional multiparty arbitration).
213. Access to justice is often considered to be related more to efficiency concerns than regulatory
concerns, although there is some debate on that issue. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25
(manuscript at 9) (analyzing the extent to which large-scale litigation in Europe can be considered regulatory).
214. See Strong, First Principles, supra note 151, at 246-68 (analyzing whether class arbitration
constitutes a form of arbitration).
215. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010); Strong, FirstPrinciples,
supra note 151, at 268-71 (concluding that class arbitration is not inherently different than other forms of
arbitration).
216. The Supreme Court has not reached that question. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 n.10 ("We
have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize
class-action arbitration."); see also Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing
Stolt-Nielsen), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012); Strong, First Principles, supra note 151, at 253 (noting
Supreme Court did not reach this issue).
217. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, IN 297, 517 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case
-documents/ita0236.pdf (discussing the issue of interpreting silence); Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, IN 154-75 (Oct. 28, 2011)
(Abi-Saab, dissenting), availableat http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (discussing
the issue of interpreting silence further); see also Bernardo M. Cremades, Multi-PartyArbitration in the New
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arbitral procedure requires the parties to demonstrate explicit consent to the procedure, 2 18
the important issue from an arbitrability perspective is that a particular matter-or in this
case, a procedure-must be considered arbitrable if the parties are capable of expressly
consenting to it.2 19 This conclusion derives from the known proposition that issues that
are non-arbitrable may not be heard in arbitration, even if the parties expressly consent to
such procedures. 220
For the last 30 years, every U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning class
arbitration has implicitly recognized that class arbitration is entirely permissible in cases
of express consent, 22 1 which suggests that class arbitration cannot be considered
procedurally non-arbitrable in the United States. 22 2 While other legal systems may come
223
to different conclusions about large-scale proceedings under their own national laws,
ICC Rules, 2012 SPAIN ARB. REV.-REVISTA DEL CLUB ESPAfjOL DEL ARBITRAJE 23, 30 (2012) (summarizing

the Abaclat decision). It is unclear whether and to what extent decisions such as Stolt-Nielsen and AT&T can be
considered in the investment realm. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1755 (2011)
(discussing use of waivers of class arbitration); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 (discussing contractual silence
or ambiguity regarding class treatment). Indeed, the majority in Abaclat specifically stated that
questions of consent under Article 25 ICSID Convention are subject to principles of international
law, and not pursuant to any particular national law. This applies not only with regard to the
material content of the consent, i.e., to its substantive validity, but also with regard to its form, i.e.,
to its formal validity.
Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1430 (internal citation omitted). This suggests that private law precedents
are irrelevant to the Abaclat analysis of consent, although the dissent discussed both cases. See Abaclat, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/5, IM148-53 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (discussing Stolt-Nielsen and AT&T Mobility).
218. See Strong, First Principles, supra note 151, at 247-50 (discussing the dangers of "quasiarbitration"). It is unclear why such a requirement would exist, unless there was something about class, mass, or
collective arbitration that was inherently different than other forms of arbitration, an allegation that does not
appear to be true. See id. at 269-71 (concluding that class arbitration is not inherently different than other forms
of arbitration); see also supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (discussing charges that class arbitration is
fundamentally different than other forms of arbitration).
219. See Strong, FirstPrinciples,supra note 151, at 264-66 (discussing arbitability in class arbitration).
220. This is because arbitrability is an issue of state concern, not party concern. See LEW ET AL., supra
note 68, 9-2 (noting arbitrability affects state interests).
221. See AT&TMobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751-52 (questioning use of representative relief but not restricting
it); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1763 (explaining that class arbitration is appropriate if a party agreed to do it);
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,451 (2003) (Breyer, J.) (noting that the claimants had consented
to arbitration); Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982) (leaving the issue to the arbitrator),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); BORN, supra note 188, at
1232 n.442 (stating that "[iut is difficult to see what . . . non-arbitrability objections could be raised to class
arbitrations"); Strong, First Principles, supra note 151, at 250 (noting that the Supreme Court has implicitly
held that class arbitration is proper if express consent is present).
222. The basis for this conclusion dates back to Mitsubishi Motors Corp., which held that courts that agree
to allow certain complex claims to go to arbitration pursuant to the parties' express agreement cannot later
claim that those matters are "inherently insusceptible to resolution by arbitration." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985); see Strong, First Principles,supra note 151, at 250
("[The Supreme Court clearly took the view that class arbitration would be entirely proper if the parties had
demonstrated express consent to such procedures.").
223. No such suggestion appears to have been made in Canada, Colombia, Germany, or Spain, which are
the four countries known to have considered class or collective arbitration. See supra notes 151, 160-61 and
accompanying text (noting, however, that collective arbitration in Spain and Germany are limited to certain
subject matters). In fact, the German Federal Court of Justice has expressly held that shareholder disputes are
arbitrable on a collective basis, if sufficient procedural safeguards exist. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal
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there has been no suggestion that parties to an international investment arbitration cannot
expressly consent to mass procedures. To the contrary, all signs so far point to the
conclusion that express consent would be sufficient to allow mass proceedings in the
investment realm. 224
Therefore, it would appear that no problems regarding procedural non-arbitrability
exist in the investment arena. Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that there is
nothing about class or collective proceedings in the abstract that suggests they could not
be applied to investment disputes. 2 25
2. Concerns Relating to PartyAutonomy
One of the primary problems with transnational regulatory litigation involves the
inability to identify a court with jurisdiction over all parties. 226 Arbitration provides a
useful alternative in this regard because arbitration, as a consent-based mechanism, 227 is
not bound by national laws regarding jurisdiction. 2 28 The consensual nature of arbitration
also allows the parties to exercise a significant amount of autonomy in the way they
structure their proceedings. 2 29 This sort of procedural flexibility exists in both contractbased and treaty-based arbitration. 230 While these attributes are often painted in a
positive light, too much autonomy can create problems in cases where arbitration is being
used as a form of regulation. 23 1
Perhaps the most important autonomy-related concern involves choice of law.

Court of Justice] Apr. 6, 2009, II ZR 255/08 (Ger.), available at www.kluwerarbitration.com; Borris, supranote
162, at 56 (explaining how the court confirmed the arbitrability of LLC shareholder disputes and defined the
requirements that arbitration agreements have to meet); Strong, DIS, supra note 162, at 47 (discussing a
German judicial decision concerning shareholder arbitration).
224. See Cremades, supra note 217, at 31 (suggesting mass procedures would be proper if the parties
agreed to them); see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
174-75, 185, 189-90 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting),
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (suggesting mass procedures would
be proper if express consent existed).
225. See DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 230 (suggesting that class arbitration could be used in investment
disputes).
226. See supra notes 108, 112 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional issues in transnational
regulatory litigation).
227. See Craig, supra note 201 (noting arbitration is a creature of contract); Stipanowich, supra note 201,
at 475 (noting intent is key in arbitration). Consent to large-scale arbitration can be obtained pre-dispute or postdispute. See Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39 (manuscript at 41) (discussing post-dispute arbitration
agreements). Consent may also be obtained on either an opt-in or opt-out basis, and may be either implicit or
explicit. See Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 537-39 (describing various forms of collective
redress); Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 151, at 1055-83 (discussing use of implicit consent in class
arbitration).
228. See Nagareda, supra note 23, at 32-41 (discussing problems with jurisdiction in transnational
regulation); Genevieve Saumier, USA -Canada Class Actions: Trading in ProceduralFairness, 5 GLOBAL
JURIST ADVANCES 1, 41-42 (2005) (discussing problems in multi-jurisdictional class actions in Canada);
Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39 (manuscript at 7) (discussing how arbitration can overcome jurisdictional
problems).
229. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 859 (2012)
(discussing how party autonomy affects procedure in arbitration).
230. See id (discussing extent of party autonomy in various types of arbitration).
231. See id at 873-75 (discussing ramifications of party autonomy).
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Arbitration agreements often include substantive choice of law provisions that eliminate
or at least minimize problems associated with the extraterritorial application of domestic
law and conflict of laws analyses. 232 However, choice of law provisions can also allow
parties with greater bargaining power to choose one-sided legal provisions that provide
certain benefits to the stronger party as a matter of substance or procedure. 233 While this
issue has arisen most frequently in the context of private arbitrations dealing with
contracts of adhesion, 2 34 some commentators have suggested that bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) and foreign trade agreements are analogous to contracts of adhesion. 235
This type of practice is of course highly problematic from a regulatory perspective,
since unfettered use of arbitration, combined with a choice of self-serving national law,
could allow potential wrongdoers to evade application of certain mandatory principles of
law. 236 Thus, a number of commentators have advocated the implementation of
mechanisms that would prevent those with "superior economic power" from taking
"unilateral control over designing a dispute system for conflicts to which it is a party" 237
and exporting "aberrant law" through the transnational regulatory process. 23 8 However,
other observers take the view that arbitration is already sufficiently well-equipped to
handle these types of threats by virtue of the second look doctrine enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi.239
While private forms of arbitration clearly benefit from the second look doctrine, the
situation is somewhat more complicated in investment arbitration, given the wide variety
of investment vehicles currently in place and the complex interaction between

232. See Nagareda, supra note 23, at 50-51 (discussing use of choice of law provisions); Strong, Mass
Torts, supra note 39 (manuscript at 40) (discussing how arbitration can avoid certain problems associated with
choice of law concerns).
233. See Glover, supra note 20, at 1211 (noting that party autonomy can lead to abuse); Nagareda, supra
note 23, at 50-51 (discussing potential problems associated with party autonomy).
234. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, Conflicting Rules of Interpretation and Construction in MultiJurisdictionalDisputes, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 599, 602 n.4 (2011) (discussing problems associated with choice
of law when parties are of unequal bargaining position).
235. See Alvarez, supra note 17, at 26-27 (comparing various treaties to contracts of adhesion).
236. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 175, 177 (2007) (discussing mandatory law in the context of investment arbitration); Kr6ll, supra note
122, %f 16-10 to 16-14, 16-18 to 16-20 (discussing use of mandatory law to protect commercial agents).
237. Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute
Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 5 (2009); see also Richard A. Posner,
The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods ofAlternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 368 (1986) (declaring that any alternative to the trial must respect relevant legal and
institutional constraints).
238. Glover, supranote 20, at 1211.
239. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)
(defining the second look doctrine); Kroll, supra note 122, IT 16-10 to 16-14, 16-18 to 16-20. In fact, some
commentators take the view that arbitration handles issues relating to choice of law concerns better than
litigation because arbitral tribunals are often able to apply the mandatory laws of a state other than that chosen
by the party to govern the dispute. See id.; see also BORN, supra note 188, at 796-97 (discussing the second
look doctrine). These experts suggest that courts are less likely to enforce foreign forum-selection clauses
because foreign courts are often perceived as less able or less inclined to apply mandatory principles of
substantive law other than that of the forum court. See Kroll, supra note 122, $$ 16-57 to 16-65 (noting relative
enforcement of arbitration agreements and forum selection clauses).
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international and domestic norms. 240 In some cases, the parties can choose to have
national law (most likely that of the respondent state) or general principles of law apply,
while in other cases the substantive law will be reflected in the governing treaty. 24 1
While there are times when an award arising out of an investment arbitration will be
subject to enforcement proceedings in a national court (and thus made subject to the
second look doctrine), there are other times when an investment award will only be
subject to treaty-based annulment proceedings. 24 2 While this issue is not fatal to the
development of regulatory arbitration in the investment arena, it is a matter that bears
further consideration as a policy matter. 243 A second, equally important issue relating to
personal autonomy involves whether and to what extent private parties can limit 244 or
eliminate 245 the availability of class, mass, or collective procedures through contractual
or treaty-based mechanisms requiring bilateral arbitration. This is something of a novel
issue, since parties have never attempted to affect the ability to proceed as a class or
collective in private law matters outside the context of arbitration and the issue has never
been raised in the public international sphere. 24 6
Up until this point, most of the analysis regarding class waivers has been formulated
240. See Bjorklund, supra note 236, at 176 (discussing availability of second look doctrine in investment
arbitration); see also infra note 271 (discussing the number of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties
currently in place).
241. See LEW ET AL., supra note 68,
28-81 to 28-84 (discussing choice of law issues in international
arbitration); see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 66 (discussing the rules of treaty interpretation).
242. See LEW ET AL., supra note 68, In 28-92 to 28-97 (discussing enforcement in investment arbitration);
Bjorklund, supra note 236 (noting some, but not all, investment awards will be subject to enforcement in
domestic courts).
243. Detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, though related matters are discussed
elsewhere. See Bjorklund, supra note 236, at 203 (noting that choice of law provisions in international treaties
involve domestic and international norms with "little direction as to how the two interact").
244. Limitations to the availability of large-scale arbitration can arise as a matter of contract interpretation,
as would occur if express consent were said to be required in cases of class arbitration. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not yet reached that question. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1758, 1776 n.10 (2010) ("We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a finding that the
parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration."); see also Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 121
(2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012) (noting Supreme Court has not reached that question);
Strong, FirstPrinciples,supranote 151, at 253 (noting Supreme Court has not addressed this issue).
245. AT&T upheld a contractual waiver of class procedures. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740, 1747-53 (2011) (discussing use of waivers of class treatment). However, other courts have struck
class waivers on other grounds, such as public policy or procedural unconscionability. See Coneff v. AT&T
Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2012) (striking waiver of class treatment); In re Am. Express Merchs.
Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), denying reh'g en banc, 667 F.3d 204, 214, 218 (2012) (stating "[w]hat
Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not do is require that all class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable"
and holding that "as the class action waiver in this case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights,
we find the arbitration provision unenforceable").
246. See Smit, supra note 155, at 203 (noting waivers of class treatment have only been discussed in the
context of arbitration). As a general rule, remedy-stripping provisions are strongly disfavored as a matter of
public policy, even if -they are embedded within an arbitration agreement. See David S. Schwartz,
UnderstandingRemedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38
U.S.F. L. REv. 49, 53-56 (2003) (discussing exculpatory clauses). However, other regulatory devices-such as
the right to punitive damages-can be waived without regard to their effect on regulatory principles. See
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (noting arbitrators are empowered to
award or withhold punitive damages, according to the contract); see also Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra
note 25 (manuscript at 31-32) (discussing role of punitive and treble damages in regulatory litigation).
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in the United States in individualistic terms that mirror the kind of analysis used to
consider the waiver of matters such as trial by jury, judicial discovery, or judicial
appeal. 247 No one disputes the fact that private individuals are entitled to waive these
sorts of individual procedural rights in both arbitration and litigation. 24 8 However,
regulatory litigation and arbitration could be seen as involving certain public rights and
249
and
benefits that may not be amenable to waiver by a single person acting alone,
framing the discussion in individualistic terms could obscure certain important public
benefits associated with class, mass, and collective relief.2 50 This can be highly
problematic, since some of these public benefits may be important from a regulatory
perspective. 25 1 A full analysis of whether and to what extent individuals can or should be
allowed to waive the ability to proceed as a class or collective as a matter of private
contract or public international law is beyond the scope of this Article. 252 Nevertheless, it
is possible to identify the potential ramifications associated with restrictions on the ability
to engage in regulatory litigation or arbitration.
2 53
First, the widespread elimination of the right to proceed as a class or collective
247. See Robert G. Bone, PartyRulemaking: Making ProceduralRules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1329, 1331 (2012) (discussing the role of party autonomy in procedural issues); Strong, Canada, supra
note 30, at 965-71 (discussing individualistic analysis of class waivers).
248. See Bone, supranote 247, at 1338 (discussing extent of party autonomy regarding procedure); Strong,
Canada,supra note 30, at 966 (discussing the traditional right of parties to contract out of individual procedural
rights).
249. See Strong, Canada,supranote 30, at 965-71 (distinguishing between public and private rights).
250. Public benefits associated with class relief can include:
(1) the ability to set legal precedent that is important for future individual and class action cases; (2)
the ability to promote public education concerning questionable business and industrial practices
that are being challenged in representative litigation; (3) the ability to uncover a pattern of
wrongdoing that otherwise would not be apparent from infrequent or widely scattered individual
cases; and (4) the ability to promote intangible psychological benefits accruing to a public that
would feel less frustrated about the unavailability of any redress when the vindication of group
rights can be observed.
Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class Action Certification
Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 74 n.36 (2010).
251. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 46) (discussing public benefits
associated with large-scale litigation).
252. Courts and commentators have begun to discuss relevant issues. See AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (discussing waiver of class procedures in arbitration); Dell Computer
160 (Can.) (discussing nature of the ability to
Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801,
proceed as a class); Bisaillon v. Concordia Univ., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666, IN 16-17 (Can.) (discussing nature of
ability to proceed as a class); In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that
"[a]s the class action waiver in this case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing the statutory rights . . . the
arbitration provision [is] unenforceable"), reh'g denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012); Bone, supra note 247, at
1332-34 (discussing "procedural rulemaking by parties"); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 49 (discussing role of
arbitration in large-scale dispute resolution); Posner, supra note 237 (noting that an "alternative to a trial must
respect relevant legal and institutional constraints . .. a proposed reform must move the legal system in the right
direction"); Strong, Canada,supra note 30, at 965-80 (noting "both the United States and Canada, in their own
ways, must consider whether class arbitration can or should play the same role as class actions in the national
legal system"); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV.
101, 129 (2012) (discussing the impact A T&TMobility will have on class arbitration).
253. The assumption is that the elimination of class, mass, or collective remedies will result in the
abandonment of the claims by the private individuals. See Strong, First Principles, supra note 151, at 238
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could lead to public actors being required to increase the amount of public enforcement
of various laws at a rate equal to the amount of private enforcement that has been lost
through elimination of private means of enforcement of public laws. This alternative
comes with a potentially significant financial cost, since public entities that engage in
regulatory litigation will need more resources to keep pace with higher levels of expected
performance. 2 54 If class proceedings are analyzed on an individual, case-by-case basis,
this additional burden on public agencies may seem insignificant. If, however, the use of
class waivers becomes routine, either generally or within a specific industry, then the cost
of replacing private enforcement with public enforcement could be substantial. 255
Furthermore, because public actors may not be as effective as private actors in regulating
some types of behavior, additional expenditures may be needed in order to bring public
entities up to the necessary standard of competence. 2 56
Second, eliminating the ability to proceed as a class or collective could lead to
public actors being expected to fill the gap left by the departure of private regulators, but
without any additional resources being provided to the relevant agencies. This scenario
would likely lead to under-deterrence, since public bodies cannot be expected to achieve
more results with the same resources they had previously. 25 7 Although public agencies in
both the United States 2 58 and Europe 259 have often had to make do with very little in the
way of resources, shortages in public funding may increase as the global economy works
its way out of the recent financial crisis.
(noting non-certification of a class, mass, or collective often sounds the "death knell" to such proceedings).
Although conventional wisdom suggests that private parties are now routinely using arbitration agreements to
obtain waivers of class and collective relief, empirical research suggests that the trend toward waiver may not
be as broad as is commonly believed. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REv. 289, 347-50 (2012) (noting class waivers are widespread in some types of
consumer transactions, such as those involving telecommunications, but not in others); Glover, supra note 20, at
1165-67 (discussing use of waivers before and after AT&T Mobility).
254. In the United States, these functions are often carried out by the Department of Justice and state
attorneys general, but other enforcement agencies may also exist. See Bayer, supra note 22 (discussing public
forms of regulatory litigation); Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14 (discussing various forms of regulatory
litigation); Meyer, supra note 22 (discussing public forms of regulatory litigation).
255. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (discussing use of waivers in
class arbitration); Drahozal, supra note 253, at 347-50 (suggesting the use of waivers is widespread in the
telecommunications industry but not necessarily in other consumer contexts); Glover, supranote 20, at 1165-67
(discussing ramifications of limiting regulatory litigation).
256. See Glover, supra note 20, at 1153-55 (describing problems with limitations on public bodies);
Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supranote 25 (manuscript at 49).
257. See Glover, supra note 20, at 1153 (discussing situations where "public governmental enforcement
bodies have limited resources that are . .. insufficient to perform the functions with which they are tasked").
258. See id. at 1154 (noting scarce public resources have long been "the rule, not the exception" in the
United States); see also Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The ProceduralAttack on Civil Rights:
The EmpiricalReality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1087, 1132-34
(2007) (discussing the role of public interest organizations in litigation and the consequences of reductions in
private enforcement actions); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1415-16 (2011) (discussing the importance of private
enforcement in special education and disabilities law); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of
Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 993, 1000-04 (2010) (discussing challenges faced by
agencies charged with public enforcement duties).
259. See Bignami, supra note 23 (noting European institutions are increasingly "overtaxed and underresourced").
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Third, eliminating the ability to proceed as a class or collective could lead to
legislative or administrative bodies increasing regulation ex ante so as to eliminate the
need for regulatory litigation ex post.26 0 While the regulations in question could simply
reflect more and more detailed provisions of the same types that are now in place, the
changes could also be different in kind. 2 6 1Thus, for example, private regulatory remedies
relating to mass torts could be replaced by criminal liability for individual and corporate
tortfeasors. 262 Alternatively, private damages for mass torts could be replaced with a
social insurance scheme that eliminates the need for wrongdoers to pay compensatory
damages. 2 63
Fourth, eliminating the right to proceed as a class or collective could inspire
legislators to act to reinstate private forms of relief, effectively superseding any judicial
decisions permitting private waiver of class or other types of regulatory remedies. 264 This
kind of iterative process wherein the legislature and judiciary mutually monitor each
other's actions is quite common in cases involving regulatory litigation, 265 and similar
behavior can be expected in the realm of regulatory arbitration as well. 26 6 Indeed,
legislative efforts have already been proposed in the United States in the wake of the

260. See Burch, supra note 24, at 70-77, 128 (discussing differences between ex ante and ex post
regulation); Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14 (discussing how regulatory litigation acts as ex post regulation).
261. See Burch, supra note 24, at 70-77, 128 (discussing how elimination of class actions could lead to
new types of regulation ex post); Strong, Canada, supra note 30, at 980 (discussing consequences of
elimination of class relief).
262. See Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalizationof Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1121, 1197-98 (1998) (noting one way to address product liability concerns would be to criminalize
illegal behavior); Frank J. Vandall, The Criminalizationof Products Liability: An Invitation to PoliticalAbuse,
Preemption,and Non-Enforcement, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 341, 342 (2008) (discussing a proposal to criminalize
some product liability torts); Byron G. Stier, PIP Breast Implants and Mass Torts in Europe, MASS TORT LITIG.
BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass tort litigation/2012/01/pip-breast-implants-andmass-torts-in-europe.html (describing the traditional European approach as "more reliant on criminal law than
tort for deterrence, compensatory damages are limited because of the comparatively extensive governmental
social insurance, punitive damages are unavailable, and class actions are traditionally not embraced").
263. This approach is common not only in Europe, but also in New Zealand. See Burch, supra note 24, at
70-77, 128 (noting elimination of regulatory litigation requires a replacement mechanism); Jules L. Coleman,
Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misalignments, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 541, 564 (2012), available at
http://yalelawjoumal.org/the-yale-law-joumal-pocket-part/tort-law/mistakes,-misunderstandings,-andmisalignments/ (discussing New Zealand's approach to tort law); Stier, supra note 262 (discussing European
approach to various types of wrongdoing).
264. See Greenberg, supra note 75, at 585-86 (discussing legislative and judicial give-and-take regarding
class relief); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 39) (discussing legislative overrides
when the political branches "believe courts have overstepped" their bounds); Ventoruzzo, supra note 108, at
439 (discussing legislative responses to judicial decisions).
265. See Greenberg,supra note 75, at 585-86 (discussing legislative and judicial give-and-take concerning
class relief); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 39) (discussing how elected branches
of government can override courts even on procedural matters); Ventoruzzo, supra note 108, at 439 (discussing
legislative reversal of various Supreme Court decisions).
266. While some commentators believe that it is more likely that legislatures will act to limit the breadth of
class or collective relief, there have been situations where legislative actors have stepped in to correct situations
where the courts have improperly restricted the availability or use of regulatory litigation. See Greenberg,supra
note 75, at 585-86 (citing employment discrimination cases); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25
(manuscript at 36) (discussing situations where the legislature has re-established broad relief in the courts
following judicial curtailment).
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Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.267
Given these potentially undesirable alternatives, potential respondents may find
regulatory litigation and arbitration to be more palatable than they might initially have
thought. 268 Indeed, these kinds of analyses demonstrate the importance of considering
regulatory litigation and arbitration as matter of institutional design rather than simply
evaluating such mechanisms on an individualistic procedural level. 269
V. REGULATORY ARBITRATION IN THE INVESTMENT CONTEXT

Before considering the extent to which Abaclat v. Argentine Republic constitutes a
form of regulatory arbitration, it is necessary to describe briefly the current debate
regarding the extent to which the international investment regime constitutes a form of
global regulation. 2 70 Differences of opinion appear to exist at both the practical and
theoretical levels.
Practically speaking, there seems to be some disagreement about the extent to which
international investment agreements are substantively similar. While commentators
universally agree that there is a significant number of instruments concerning
international investment, 27 1 people frame the content of these instruments differently. For
example, some observers claim that the various treaties share "a surprising pattern of
common features," suggesting that "a common law of investment protection" is in the
process of developing. 272 Other experts believe that "there is so much divergence in the
267. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (discussing waiver of class relief in
arbitration); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011) (seeking to prevent the use of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in certain contexts); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong.
(2011) (seeking to prevent the use of predispute arbitration clauses in certain contracts).
268. See Burch, supra note 24, at 70-77, 128 (noting elimination of class relief may lead to increased
regulation through other means); Strong, Canada,supra note 30, at 980 (discussing the potential ramifications
of a widespread limitation on class relief).
269. See Matthew C. Stephenson, PublicRegulation of PrivateEnforcement: The Casefor Expanding the
Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 106-21 (2005) (discussing advantages and consequences
of private enforcement suits).
270. See generally Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0236.pdf (providing the basis for a regulatory arbitration evaluation). For a summary of the
development of international investment law and arbitration, see generally Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875
(2011) (discussing trends and development of the literature in international investment law).
271. Most commentators put the number of bilateral and multilateral agreements between 2600 and 3000.
See Alvarez, supra note 17, at 17 (estimating numbers of investment treaties); Born, supra note 229, at 844
(discussing scope of investment treaties); see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 5 (describing the field
of international investment arbitration as a "patchwork quilt of interlocking but separate bilateral treaties"); Jan
Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 236 (1995) (putting the
number of investment treaties at 5000). In addition to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), investment arbitration
involves multilateral investment treaties (MITs), investment protection agreements (IPAs), foreign investment
laws, and free trade agreements (FTAs). See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 25-43 (discussing various
instruments prevalent in investment realm). See generally LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBiTRATION
(2010) (detailing the investment regime); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY (2001) (outlining the international investment regime).
272. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 5, 18; see also Alvarez, supra note 17, at 41-45 (discussing
similarities of investment treaties); Efraim Chalamish, The Future of BilateralInvestment Treaties: A De Facto
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standards in bilateral investment treaties that it is premature to conclude that they give
273
While this Article does not focus on
rise to any significant rule of international law."
issues of substantive concern and therefore will not delve further into this debate, the
amount of similarity between the various treaties and international agreements is relevant
to this discussion to the extent that such similarities affect (1) determinations about the
extent to which international investment law constitutes an independent regulatory
regime 2 74 and (2) considerations regarding the viability of multinational class, mass, or
collective proceedings. 2 75
Differences of opinion also exist at a theoretical level. Some commentators espouse
what has been called the "liberal internationalist" view of investment law, which holds
that "investment arbitration should be treated as a unique, internationally-organized
strand of the administrative law systems of states" because "[t]he subject matter of
investment arbitration is a regulatory dispute arising between the state (acting in a public
capacity) and an individual who is subject to the exercise of public authority by the
state." 276 This conclusion appears to be supported by the fact that "the regime of
investment arbitration [is] established by a sovereign act of the state" as well as by the
fact that investment arbitration is "designed to resolve disputes arising from the exercise
of public authority." 2 77
Under the liberal internationalist view,
the underlying purpose of international investment law is ... to provide a
global regulatory environment favourable to investors-that "the system of
international investment arbitration ... has been set up as one of the major new
tools in improving good governance in the global economy." From this
MultilateralAgreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 321 (2009) (discussing similarities of investment treaties).
273.

M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 206 (2d ed. 2004); see also

Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralizationof InternationalInvestment Law, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
33, 124 (2009) (describing differences in investment treaties).
274. Compare Chalamish, supra note 272 (suggesting most BITs reflect "an international consensus on
dispute settlement norms, . . .and attempt[] to create an international jurisprudence for international investment
law, notwithstanding that such jurisprudence is developed by numerous ad hoc international tribunals. This
analysis reinforces the view that the substance of the treaties, along with their lack of differentiation and
competitiveness, strengthens BITs' role as an investment regulatory regime on a multilateral, not just a bilateral,
level" (citation omitted)), with Leon E. Trakman, ForeignDirect Investment: Hazardor Opportunity?, 41 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 22 (2009) (noting various differences between BITs and free trade agreements (FTAs),
both with respect to substance and dispute resolution).
275. Commentators who see a high degree of substantive or procedural similarity between the various
investment treaties may perceive few problems in constructing multinational classes or collectives in investment
arbitration. See DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 207 (noting similarities in investment treaties could support
multinational classes in large-scale investment arbitration). The principle is the same as in private arbitration, in
that multiparty procedures may be considered appropriate if the underlying arbitration agreements are
sufficiently similar as a procedural matter and implicit consent to such treatment exists. See Strong, First
Principles,supra note 151, at 251-54 (discussing consent in class arbitration); Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra
note 151, at 1062-63 (discussing method of identifying implicit consent in class arbitration). While Abaclat did
not address this issue, since all members of the claimant group were of the same nationality, these sorts of
concerns may be important in future cases involving mass investment arbitration. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, 513 (suggesting "claims are proper and manageable" in part because "[c]laimants are from a single
jurisdiction").
276. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 15, at 148.
277. Id
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perspective, . . . international investment law may be characterized as public
law, serving private interests. It is a development of international public law,
because it is a universal regime focused on regulating the exercise of state
powers. But it serves private interests, because its principal goal is to liberate
investors from state regulatory control, and maximize the freedom of global
capital movements. 278
The fact that "most regulatory disputes are adjudicated by domestic courts in
accordance with domestic law, or by a specialized domestic tribunal subject to
supervision by domestic courts," is not problematic for those adhering to the liberal
internationalist perspective because "the general consent authorizes the adjudication of
regulatory disputes by an international tribunal." 2 79 Thus, people adopting this view say
that the investment regime requires (or shortly will require) "a system of compulsory
arbitration against States for all matters relating to international investments, at the
initiative of the private actors of international economic relations." 280
This approach to investment arbitration is fiercely opposed by persons espousing the
"sovereigntist" perspective, which "doubt[s] the inherent desirability of free global
markets and internationalized regulation" and instead emphasizes "the values of
nationalism, state sovereignty, and the need to protect the internal domain of states, their
domestic policies and culture." 28 1 Proponents of this position consider the existence of an
international regulatory regime as much more doubtful and, to the extent such a regime
exists, much more limited in scope, given that the investment arbitration regime is not
meant to protect every type of economic transaction that could possibly arise. 282
Detailed analysis of the two theoretical views of investment arbitration is beyond the
scope of this Article. 283 However, it is useful to note that it may be impossible to
determine which approach is ultimately "correct" as a matter of treaty interpretation
because the debate reflects "deeper uncertainties underlying international investment
law" and, as such, may not be "susceptible to technical or doctrinal solutions" alone. 2 84
Therefore, other sorts of analyses-such as the one in this Article-may be necessary to
provide alternative perspectives on various issues, including questions relating to the
propriety of mass procedures.
These theoretical concerns are not just fodder for academic debate. Instead, the two
views of investment arbitration have practical ramifications and are in fact reflected in
the jurisdictional awards rendered in Abaclat, with the majority siding with the liberal
internationalists and the dissent aligning itself with the sovereigntists. 2 85 This is both
278. Mills, supra note 15, at 501 (citations omitted).
279. Van Harten & Loughlin, supranote 15, at 148-49.
280. SCHREUER, supra note 271, at xii (citing research conducted by Brigitte Stern in 2000). This use of
private actors to enforce public laws is entirely consistent with the definition of regulatory litigation. See Luff,
supra note 21, at 113 (describing regulatory litigation); see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text
(explaining how the use of private actors is consistent with achieving regulatory objectives).
281. Mills, supra note 15, at 502.
282. See id. (discussing support for narrower interpretation of investment obligations); Michele Potesti,
Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba Interim Award, 106 AM. J.INT'L L. 341, 347 (2012) (discussing BITs).
283. For further reading, see Mills, supranote 15, at 469.
284. Id. at 503; see also Strong, Abaclat, supra note 8 (discussing rationales supporting mass claims in
investment arbitration).
285. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
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intriguing and important, since it suggests future cases involving mass investment claims
could be subject to the same kind of ideological divisions.
Having put Abaclat in its proper context, it is time to consider whether and to what
extent the mass procedures proposed in Abaclat constitute a form of regulatory arbitration
independent of any regulatory aims that might or might not be associated with investment
law as a general proposition. 286 The analysis considers each of the three elements
necessary to establish regulatory litigation and regulatory arbitration separately: intent, a
pre-existing substantive norm, and a rule or remedy that provides a forward-looking
effect. 28 7
A. Intent
The first aspect of the test for regulatory litigation and arbitration, intent, requires
"not only the desire to influence behavior as the conscious object of the one who would
regulate, but also the desire to prevent some future, risk-producing behavior." 2 88 This
element could be problematic for those attempting to frame Abaclat as a form of
regulatory arbitration, at least to the extent that the focus is on the intent of the arbitrators.
On the one hand, the majority clearly indicated that "[c]ollective proceedings are ...
consistent with the purpose and object of the BIT." 2 89 While this statement is in many
ways helpful, it does not express an intent to regulate or deter. In fact, the majority
appeared to downplay the forward-looking (i.e., regulatory) effect of its award, stating
explicitly that its decision regarding the use of mass proceedings was not intended to act
as a form of procedural precedent 290 and denying that it had taken any policy
considerations into account when determining the various issues, indicating instead that
the outcome was based on a strict reading of the BIT itself.2 9 1
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 537 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0236.pdf (reflecting liberal internationalist tendencies); Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 272 (Oct. 28, 2011) (AbiSaab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (reflecting
sovereignist tendencies).
286. See generallyAbactat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5.
287. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14 (explaining three-prong test for regulatory litigation); see also
supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory litigation as a risk regulator).
288. Luff, supra note 21, at 113.
289. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,1 513.
227, 523-27 (explaining that the tribunal's decision does not have precedential value).
290. See id
291. Interestingly, the policy arguments appear to have been raised primarily by Argentina rather than the
claimants. The tribunal responded to these arguments by stating that
[p]olicy reasons are for States to take into account when negotiating BITs and consenting to ICSID
jurisdiction in general, not for the Tribunal to take into account in order to repair an inappropriately
negotiated or drafted BIT. The present BIT is clear, it includes bonds and security entitlements ....
Whether or not ICSID is the best way to deal with a dispute relating to these bonds and security
entitlements in the context of foreign debt restructuring is irrelevant. The Parties chose ICSID
arbitration for this kind of dispute. They, as well as the Tribunal, are bound by such choice and
cannot evade it based on controversial policy reasons.
Id. 550. The dissent took the view that the majority had relied on improper policy considerations. See Abaclat
(formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 265 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0237.pdf (claiming that the majority relied on policy issues).
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In many ways, the absence of any visible regulatory intent in the Abaclat majority
award is not surprising. 292 While it is possible that an arbitral tribunal could indicate an
intent to regulate certain behavior, it is more likely that arbitrators will disguise or deny
any regulatory aims in large-scale arbitration, given the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
29 3
criticism of policy-driven awards in the context of an international class arbitration.
294
panelists
While arbitrators in investment proceedings are not bound by U.S. precedent,
who are concerned about protecting their awards are unlikely to include controversial
elements that may result in an annulment.
However, regulatory intent does not rely solely on the mentality of the court or
tribunal. 29 5 Instead, the necessary intent can be provided by the litigants. 29 6 All that is
necessary is that the actor providing the requisite intent "intend[s] to produce some action
on the part of the target of regulation because of the risk (and the litigant's or judge's
apprehension of the risk) that the target actor's future behavior will fall short of the
relevant norm." 297
Taking the burden of regulatory intent off the arbitrators opens the door to some
interesting analysis. For example, a state respondent could be said to have provided the
necessary regulatory intent to the extent investment arbitration can be framed as a
regulatory mechanism. 298 This approach would take any general regulatory intent that
already exists in investment arbitration and carry it over to disputes involving class, mass,
or collective claims, thus eliminating the need to show any additional specific intent to
use large-scale litigation procedures in a regulatory manner. 29 9 While this technique is
292. See generally Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (discussing the propriety of mass proceedings).
293. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769 (2010) (noting "[t]he
conclusion is inescapable that the panel simply imposed its own conception of sound policy"). But see id at
1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's characterization as "hardly fair"); Strong, First
Principles,supra note 151, at 239 (discussing Supreme Court's allegation).
294. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the law applicable in investment arbitration).
The tribunal was nevertheless aware of developments in the United States. Indeed, the dissent explicitly
discussed two U.S. Supreme Court cases-Stolt-Nielsen and AT&T Mobiliiy-in its decision. See Abaclat,
148-53 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions in
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Stolt-Nielsen and AT&T Mobility); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
(discussing use of waivers in class arbitration); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758 (discussing contractual silence
and ambiguity regarding class treatment in arbitration).
295. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (describing necessary intent in regulatory litigation).
296. See id. (discussing intent in regulatory litigation).
297. Id at 114.
298. See Mills, supra note 15 (discussing investment law's regulatory potential); Van Harten & Loughlin,
supra note 15, at 148 (discussing how investment law can be considered to be a strand of administrative law).
Respondents in private arbitration would likely not be seen as having a regulatory intent, since they have been
put in a defensive posture. However, respondents in treaty-based arbitration often come to the arbitral process as
a result of certain bilateral or multilateral agreements, and it could be said that the state parties have consented
to mutually regulate each other's behavior through investment arbitration. Therefore, it is appropriate to at least
consider the possibility that a state respondent in treaty arbitration could have a regulatory intent.
299. While critics could argue that this approach is reminiscent of the argument criticized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen (i.e., that an agreement to arbitration, without more, cannot constitute an
agreement to class proceedings), the situation is slightly different. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775
(discussing contractual silence or ambiguity in context of class arbitration). Here, the hypothesis is that a preexisting general intent to allow investment arbitration to act as an international regulatory agent can provide the
necessary specific intent to allow additional mechanisms meant to make the pre-established regulatory regime
more effective.
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not recommended for general use, since it triggers the potentially irreconcilable division
between the liberal internationalist and sovereigntist views of investment arbitration, it
does provide food for thought. 30 0
Another, more likely possibility is that the claimants in an investment proceeding
have supplied the necessary intent. 301 As it turns out, the bondholders in Abaclat appear
to have had a type of regulatory intent in mind when they filed their arbitration, based on
their statements that "[t]he major threat to the efficiency of foreign debt restructuring [is]
rogue debtors, such as Argentina. Consequently, opening the door to ICSID arbitration
would create a supplementary leverage against such rogue debtors and therefore be
beneficial to the efficiency of foreign debt restructuring." 302 While the dissent disagreed
with the propriety of the claimants' use of investment arbitration as a means of creating
"leverage over sovereign debtors," the dissent did not dispute that that was the claimants'
aim.3 03 Therefore, it would likely appear that the necessary regulatory intent existed in
Abaclat.
Although Abaclat meets the first element of the test for regulatory arbitration, the
analysis may not be as clear-cut in future investment disputes. In those cases, it may be
useful to recall that some commentators believe that specific intent on the part of the
parties, judge, or arbitral tribunal need not be established so long as there is a regulatory
effect. 304
Interestingly, analyses that rely solely on regulatory effects can be refrained as
involving intent, although in these cases the intent would not be that of the litigants,
judge, or tribunal, but instead that of the legislature in private disputes or the state parties
to the relevant investment agreements in investment disputes. This analysis essentially
comes down to a question of institutional design, based on the notion that the legislature
in domestic disputes or the states parties in investment disputes have intended litigation
or arbitration to act as a regulatory device within the legal system in question. 3 05
Although this process may appear to be largely a matter of semantics, refraining the issue
as one of intent can provide a helpful response to certain questions relating to privity.
Regulatory litigation arises out of the notion that private parties and judges can
300. See Mills, supra note 15 (noting irreconcilability of liberal internationalists and sovereigntist views);
see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
537 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0236.pdf (reflecting liberal internationalist perspective); Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 272 (Oct. 28, 2011) (AbiSaab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO237.pdf (reflecting
sovereigntist perspective).
301. Any analysis of claimants' intent cannot be conducted in the abstract, since the inquiry must focus on
the precise submissions and facts at issue in any particular dispute. Analysis of the regulatory intent of state
respondents is somewhat different, since the relevant instruments (treaties and other international agreements)
exhibiting state consent to arbitration exist prior to the filings in the particular dispute at issue.
302. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 514. The dissent urged against an expansive reading of the
ability of international investment arbitration to reach claims of this nature. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5,
157, 258, 265-74 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (supporting a narrower interpretation of the relevant
treaties).
303. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,1 265 (Abi-Saab, dissenting).
304. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory intent).
305. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14 (discussing issues relating to institutional design). In this context,
the investment regime can be considered a stand-alone, legal system.
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"use[] litigation and the courts to achieve and apply regulatory outcomes to entire
industries." 306 However, some people, such as the dissenting panelist in Abaclat, may
take the view that it is inappropriate to look to party or arbitrator intent when considering
the propriety of regulatory arbitration in the investment arena because private individuals
and arbitral tribunals are not themselves parties to the international agreements
underlying the arbitral proceeding in question, nor do these persons stand in privity with
one of the state signatories to the agreement. 30 7 Under this analysis, arbitrators' and
litigants' desire to use the agreements as the basis for regulatory litigation and arbitration
would be irrelevant, since it is the states' intent at the time the documents were drafted
that controls. 30 8
Issues relating to privity in investment arbitration have been raised before, with the
most well-known response coming from Jan Paulsson, who took the view that requiring a
strict rule of privity in investment arbitration would be "unworkable" and that the regime
was therefore based on the concept of "direct action," which "allows the true complainant
to face the true defendant." 309 Given contemporary interpretations of the purposes and
practice of investment arbitration, strict application of the concept of privity to questions
of regulatory intent would appear equally inappropriate. 3 10
Strict application of the concept of privity is often related to the debate about the
"original intent" of treaties and other international agreements. While some people,
including the dissent in Abaclat, take the view that the original intent of the state parties
should govern the interpretation of the treaties in all future cases, 3 1t other interpretive
techniques also exist. For example, Jos6 Alvarez takes the view that
[t]he "original intent" behind the signing of BITs is, as time passes,
increasingly irrelevant-as subsequent events and actions triggered by the
ratification of BITs and FTAs, including changes in local law, occur, and as
other opportunities for states to demonstrate their views and to react arise. It is
these, not the original intention of BITs, which are relevant to determinations of
state practice and opinio juris. 3 12
This more flexible approach to treaty interpretation is quite useful for proponents of
regulatory arbitration. If investment arbitration is seen as incorporating a certain amount
of flexibility so as to be able to respond to certain types of unanticipated risk, 3 13 then the
306. Id at 96.
307. See LEW ET AL., supra note 68, IN 28-11, 28-21 (discussing privity in investment arbitration);
Paulsson, supra note 271, at 256 (describing the principle of direct action, which results in arbitration without
privity).
308. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, I 16, 164-67 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (discussing the intent
to arbitrate demonstrated by the states parties).
309. Paulsson, supra note 271, at 255-56; see also Born, supra note 229, at 833 (disputing the
characterization of investment arbitration as being without privity).
310. See Born, supra note 229, at 838 (noting that "investment arbitration regimes are effectively
mandatory for many states"); Schill, Legitimacy, supra note 15, at 77 (discussing privity in investment
arbitration).
311. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, TT 16, 164-67 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (discussing
foreseeability of collective actions at the time of drafting).
312. Alvarez, supranote 17, at 44; see also Strik, supra note 3, at 189-90 (discussing the consequences of
not considering sovereign debt instruments to constitute an "investment").
313. See Luff, supra note 21, at 74 (discussing regulatory litigation as a risk regulator). Not everyone
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use of regulatory litigation techniques such as class, mass, and collective procedures can
be seen as consistent with investment law's institutional design. 3 14
The concept of legislative intent could also be useful in overcoming other
difficulties involving regulatory arbitration in the investment arena. For example, some
disagreement exists as to whether the requisite regulatory effect needs to be felt only by
the individual respondent or whether the effect must be experienced on an industry-wide
level. 3 15 Requiring a broad regulatory effect could be problematic for arbitration, since
that effect is typically generated through publicity associated with a negative
determination on the merits (or the threat thereof) 3 16 and arbitration is commonly
considered to be a private and confidential process. 317 While the perceived "right" to
privacy and confidentiality is often overstated,3 18 parties may nevertheless argue that
their expectation was that the process would be private and confidential rather than
public. 3 19
Contract-based forms of arbitration have addressed this concern in a variety of ways,
either by judicial recognition of a public policy exception to the concept of arbitral
privacy in certain limited circumstances 320 or by explicitly requiring all awards relating
to class arbitration to be made publicly available. 32 1 However, similar problems do not
arise in the investment context, since many investment awards are already made public as

views the investment regime as reflecting a high degree of flexibility. See Trakman, supra note 274, at 3 (noting
dangers of excessive flexibility and rigidity).
314. Of course, discussions about the appropriate amount of flexibility in the investment realm are in ways
reminiscent of the debate about liberal internationalism and sovereigntism. See supra notes 276-82 and
accompanying text.
315. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14 (discussing scope of regulatory effect); see also supra notes 86-87
and accompanying text (discussing regulatory effect).
316. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate
Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 132 (2003) (suggesting in some cases, negative publicity
is a more effective deterrent than monetary sanctions). If the regulatory effect focuses only on the respondent in
the proceeding in question, then publicity is irrelevant.
317. See BORN, supra note 188, at 1765 (discussing privacy and confidentiality in arbitration); GAILLARD
& SAVAGE, supra note 68, 7 (discussing privacy and confidentiality in arbitration).
318. Although privacy and confidentiality are hallmarks of arbitration, neither is required for the process to
be considered arbitration per se. Indeed, most national and international laws do not provide for privacy or
confidentiality in arbitration. See BORN, supra note 188, at 1765 (discussing absence of any laws regarding
privacy or confidentiality in arbitration); GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 68, 7 (noting absence of national
provisions regarding privacy or confidentiality in arbitration); Strong, First Principles,supra note 151, at 206
(noting arbitration does not require privacy or confidentiality). Instead, parties must specifically adopt
provisions regarding privacy and confidentiality, either in their arbitration agreement or through the use of
arbitral rules with the desired level of protection. See BORN, supra note 188, at 2249-50, 2253 (suggesting
parties draft agreements to provide the desired level of privacy and confidentiality).
319. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (suggesting limits on privacy
and confidentiality in class arbitration); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776
(2010) (considering the parties' expectations of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration).
320. See Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 151, at 1086-89 (discussing how public policy might affect
determinations about privacy and confidentiality in arbitration).
321. See Class Arbitration Case Docket, supra note 147 (publishing awards); AAA SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES, supra note 154, R. 9(1) (describing derogation of the principles of privacy and confidentiality). Some
class arbitration rules do not provide for publication of awards, which could limit or eliminate any regulatory
effect involving third parties. See JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 154 (failing to indicate any
means of publishing class awards).
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a matter of course. 32 2 This suggests that class, mass, or collective awards can be
published (and thus can provide industry-wide regulatory effects) in the investment realm
without any change to current procedures.
It is also possible to view the routine publication of arbitral awards in investment
arbitration as a form of legislative intent to regulate the field of international
investment. 32 3 Indeed, the increasing reliance on precedent in investment arbitration
could be taken as supporting the notion that a form of regulatory litigation is in the
process of developing, since precedent identifies the parameters of acceptable behavior
on a going-forward basis and thus deters (or regulates) socially undesirable behavior. 324
Therefore, intent does not appear to be a problem in Abaclat or for most investment
arbitrations. As such, one element of the three-prong test for regulatory arbitration is
satisfied.
B. A Substantive Norm
The second part of the test for regulatory litigation and arbitration involves the
existence of a pre-established substantive norm. In some. ways, this requirement may
seem strange, since parties in all forms of litigation and arbitration need to base their
claims on some sort of pre-existing substantive law. 32 5 However, regulatory litigation
and arbitration use these substantive norms in a special, forward-looking manner so as "to
produce some action on the part of the target of regulation" that will reduce "the risk (and
the litigant's or judge's apprehension of the risk) that the target actor's future behavior
will fall short of the relevant norm." 3 26
The means by which this forward-looking objective is achieved is described in Part
V.C. 327 However, the existence of this second element-a substantive norm-is easily
met in investment arbitration, since the treaties and agreements that create the
international investment regime contain a variety of substantive rules that are to be
enforced through arbitral proceedings. 328 This is true even in cases such as Abaclat,
which involves a number of novel substantive claims. 32 9 Although the parties may
322. See McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 57 (noting that "it is routine for the basic details of the
arbitration to be in the public domain" and that "parties are usually encouraged to allow the award to be
published"); see also DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 223-24 (discussing publication of awards in investment realm).
323. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 15, at 148-49 (discussing investment law as a type of global
administrative law).
324. See Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12
GERMAN L.J. 1083, 1101-03 (2011) (stating "that arbitral decisions increasingly craft treaty-overarching rules
of international investment law and thereby function as a mechanism of global governance").
325. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (noting that "some authors have suggested that all litigation is
regulatory").
326. Id. at 113-14.
327. See infra notes 331-412 and accompanying text (discussing how this forward-looking objective is
achieved in regulatory arbitration).
328. See McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 66 (noting "[the substantive law applied in a treaty
arbitration is the treaty itself'). Investment arbitration is notable in the realm of public international law for its
application of "comparatively specific legal rules, rather than indeterminate standards." Born, supra note 229, at
872 n.388.
329. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 251-98 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0236.pdf (identifying various substantive claims at issue).
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disagree about the precise nature of the relevant norms and the extent to which they apply
to the dispute in question, it is clear that the requisite rules exist and can be enforced
through the arbitral proceedings.3 30 Therefore, the second element of the test for
regulatory arbitration is satisfied as well, both in Abaclat and in investment arbitration
more generally.
C. A Rule or Remedy
The third part of the test for regulatory litigation and arbitration involves the
existence of a rule, typically in the form of a remedy, "that expresses the [substantive]
norm to the world and attempts to limit the threats (risk) to that norm." 33 1 This
requirement may be the most difficult for Abaclat to meet, given the novelty of mass
procedures in investment arbitration 332 and the relative silence of the various treaties in
question. 333 Each of these concerns is addressed separately below.
1. Issues Relating to Novelty
a. ProceduralInquiries
Issues relating to the novelty of class, mass, or collective procedures in investment
arbitration can be analyzed in several different ways. One line of inquiry focuses on
whether these types of large-scale procedures are really all that different from what the
respondent might otherwise have expected. While much has been made of the fact that
Abaclat constitutes the first time a mass claim has been brought in investment
arbitration, 3 34 some commentators see very few "differences between the workings of the
class action or class arbitration system and that of investment arbitration," since "[b]oth
are characterized by . .. multiple claimants against one respondent, be it a tobacco
company in the case of class actions, or a state in investment arbitration." 335
The multiplicity of potential claimants in investment arbitration arises as a result of
"the 'standing offer' consent mechanism in BITs, which provides no indication of the
number, scope and type of claims that the state is likely to face." 336 This allows multiple
330. See id (noting areas of substantive dispute); see also ICSID Convention, supra note 4 (describing
substantive standards by which investment disputes are resolved); Argentina-Italy BIT, supra note 4 (allowing
user to search for BITs by country).
331. Luff, supra note 21, at 113-14.
332. See Cross, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that Abaclat was "unprecedented").
333. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, IM154-75 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (noting the silence of the relevant treaties concerning mass
procedures). In this case, the Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings
(Institution Rules) and Rules for Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitration Rules) governed the
221, 426 (explaining the procedural framework in which
procedure. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
the tribunal had to operate).
334. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, In 295, 488 (noting the novelty of this type of mass claim);
Cross, supra note 12, at 1 (noting novelty of Abaclat).
335. DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 204.
336. Id. at 210; see also Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, T 513 (stating "[c]ollective proceedings are.
consistent with the purpose and object of the BIT, since the high number of Claimants is inherent to the
nature of the investments protected by the BIT").
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investors "to bring their respective claims how and when they see fit" and leaves the
respondent state open to multiple claims from an unknown number of parties. 337
Therefore, the identity of the various claimants cannot be problematic, since all of these
individuals could have brought their claims in bilateral proceedings. 338
Although the common understanding of investment arbitration as constituting an
offer to arbitrate 339 resolves one potential problem (the question of "with whom"
respondents are required to arbitrate), difficulties might also arise with respect to the
types of claims at issue (the question of "what" respondents are required to arbitrate) and
the procedures to be used (the question of "how" claims are to be resolved). 340
Interestingly, there may be sufficient similarities between certain types of class, mass, or
collective arbitrations on the one hand, and bilateral arbitrations on the other, so as to
avoid allegations that the respondent could not anticipate the rule or remedy at issue. 34 1
For example, the question of "what" is being arbitrated is largely unproblematic in
situations involving homogenous claims, since those cases present the respondent with
what is effectively a single substantive claim. 342 While certain adjustments might need to
be made in cases where some claims or defenses apply to one group of claimants but not
another, that type of situation can often be resolved through the use of subclasses, as
suggested by the Abaclat majority. 343 Therefore, "[a]ssuming that the Tribunal has
jurisdiction over the claims of several individual Claimants, it is difficult to conceive why
and how the Tribunal could loose [sic] such jurisdiction where the number of Claimants
outgrows a certain threshold." 344
337. DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 210. The downside to the standing offer mechanism is that multiple claims
can be brought "without having any regard to the similarity of claims amongst them, nor to any notions of
binding effect with respect to completed awards." Id.; see also infra notes 376-81 and accompanying text
(discussing the effects of inconsistent awards).
338. Of course, the possibility of Argentina having to face 60,000 individual arbitrations is relatively low,
since it would be highly unlikely for individual bondholders to bring separate claims, given the cost of ICSID
proceedings. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, T 537 (explaining cost prohibitive nature of individual
filings for small disputes); Penusliski, supra note 66, at 524-26 (outlining the average cost of an ICSID
arbitration); see also Strong, FirstPrinciples, supra note 151, at 238 (noting non-certification of a class, mass,
or collective often sounds the "death knell" to such proceedings).
339. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 52-54 (concluding the concept of investment arbitration as
constituting an offer to arbitrate "is no longer controversial"); see also SCHREUER, supra note 271, at xii (noting
longstanding acceptance of the offer to arbitrate principle); Paulsson, supra note 271, at 240-41 (discussing the
concept of an offer to arbitrate).
340. The question "with whom am I required to arbitrate?" was said to be central in the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Stolt-Nielsen. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010)
(framing the issue as one of consent); Strong, FirstPrinciples,supra note 151, at 252 (discussing the concept of
secondary consent).
341. Argentina noted that "[a]t the time of the conclusion of ICSID Convention and BIT, collective claims
were allowed neither in Italy nor in Argentina, and could therefore not have been envisaged by Argentina."
Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,1471(ii).
342. See id. J 237, 540 (discussing homogeneity of claims at issue); see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara)
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, $T 154-75 (Oct.
28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf
(discussing how class arbitration involves what is at essence a single claim).
343. See Abaclar, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
666-69 (contemplating the possibility of subclasses). For
example, the respondent in Abaclat wanted to assert certain defenses that would only be availing against legal
persons, not natural persons. See id. M 1-4, 401-02 (discussing differentiation of various defenses).
344. Id. 490.

HeinOnline -- 38 J. Corp. L. 310 2012-2013

2013]

Mass Proceduresas a Form of "Regulatory Arbitration"

311

The most difficult question involves how mass claims are to be resolved. As the
majority in Abaclat recognized, mass claims can require certain alterations to the arbitral
procedures. 345 While no decisions have yet been made as to which, if any, of the various
options discussed in the jurisdictional award in Abaclat will ultimately be adopted, the
dissent took the view that all of the proposed procedures were entirely novel in the
investment arena and therefore inappropriate. 346
Detailed analysis of whether and to what extent mass procedures in Abaclat change
how investment claims are heard will have to wait until the tribunal makes a final
determination about the procedures to be used. 347 Nevertheless, some prospective
arguments can be anticipated and addressed even at this early stage.
For example, opponents to large-scale litigation techniques often argue that mass
procedures "change the nature" of investment arbitration in some way, based on certain
expectations about what arbitration is supposed to be. 348 Indeed, such assertions have
been made in Abaclat and will likely arise in other investment disputes. 349 However,
such allegations must be considered pursuant to the objective legal standards governing
the arbitral proceedings in question rather than by reference to the parties' subjective
expectations, unless those subjective understandings have been reflected in the governing
legal instruments. 350
Furthermore, some of the ways in which large-scale arbitration may be said to
"change the nature of arbitration" are unavailing in the investment context. 35 1 For
example, the argument that arbitration is supposed to reflect a certain amount of
procedural informality 352 is unlikely to be raised in investment arbitration, which is itself
quite formal. 353 Similarly, parties in mass arbitrations such as Abaclat will be unable to
argue that the procedures in question are unexpected because of their representative

345. See supra notes 164-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the need to alter procedures to address
mass claims).
346. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 194 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (noting that the tribunal does
not have the authority to adopt its own rules of procedure).
347. See supra notes 164-82 and accompanying text (explaining the procedural decisions that have been
made to date).
348. These arguments have been raised in class arbitration in the United States. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010) (claiming class arbitration "changes the nature" of
arbitration); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (suggesting class
arbitration is in some way different than other forms of arbitration); Strong, FirstPrinciples,supra note 151, at
201-71 (discussing whether and to what extent class arbitration can be said to differ from other forms of
arbitration).
171-72 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (characterizing mass
349. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
procedures as a "quantum leap" from other types of arbitration).
350. See Strong, First Principles,supra note 151, at 226 (explaining parties are bound by the objective
intent reflected in the contract); see also Strik, supra note 3, at 189-90 (discussing how the requirement of an
"investment" cannot be diluted by the will of the parties).
351. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (discussing size and complexity of class arbitration);
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (discussing size and complexity of class arbitration); Strong, First
Principles,supra note 151, at 212-41 (considering ways in which class arbitration might differ from other
forms of arbitration).
352. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775-76; Schill, Legitimacy,
supranote 15, at 72-73.
353. See Strong, FirstPrinciples,supranote 151, at 212-13 (discussing size of class arbitrations).
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nature, since the claims in question have been asserted on an aggregative basis. 354
Furthermore, claims that arbitration is "supposed to be" bilateral in nature 355 can be
answered with references to the various multiparty proceedings that have been filed in the
investment arena in the past. 356
Although the parties in Abaclat can argue that mass proceedings were unexpected in
their case, it will be increasingly difficult for parties to make that claim going forward,
since the investment community is now on notice that large-scale claims may be brought
under an investment treaty. 3 57 It is possible that arguments regarding novelty or surprise
may be made for some years to come, since some state respondents may take the view
that they are not able to conclude an agreement to exclude large-scale arbitral
proceedings in the short term. 358 However, a number of commentators have noted the
ability of states to respond to changing circumstances and to make appropriate changes in
their investment laws and agreements, so allegations about the difficulty of amending
international agreements must be considered with a degree of caution. 359
Another way to analyze the novelty issue would be to consider whether the
procedures proposed for use in Abaclat and similar proceedings are well known in other
types of litigation or arbitration, even if the procedures in question have not yet been used
in the investment context. For example, a number of means of facilitating the
presentation of evidence that were discussed in Abaclat have been used in other class,
mass, and collective proceedings. 360 Other time-saving devices have been used in

354. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, $ 488 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0236.pdf, Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 529.
355. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (assuming arbitration is bilateral in nature); Stolt-Nielsen, 130
S. Ct. at 1775 (assuming arbitration is bilateral in nature); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 529
(stating "arbitration is traditionally viewed as a bilateral process"); Strong, FirstPrinciples,supra note 151, at
203-04 (noting assumption of bilateralism).
356. See Anderson v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, 3 (May 10,
2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/AndersonvCostaRicaAwardl9May2010.pdf (resolving dispute
between Canadian investors and the Republic of Costa Rica); Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/6, Award, T 90 (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://italaw.com/documents/Zimbabwe
Award.pdf (ordering the government of Zimbabwe to compensate Dutch investors).
357. See Alvarez, supra note 17, at 44 (noting state parties are able to react and respond to events relating
to investment treaties); Strik, supra note 3, at 190-91 ("There are many examples of investors that only
discovered the existence of BITs long after they had made their investment and after they had encountered
unlawful actions of the host states for which BITs offered protection."); Strong, De-Americanization,supra note
43, at 529 (regarding lack of surprise).
358. See DIMSEY, supranote 11, at 211 (noting that changing treaties can be quite difficult).
359. See Born, supra note 229, at 844 (noting states may change treaties to account for changes in
circumstance); Alvarez, supra note 17, at 44 (discussing flexibility of treaties); Strik, supra note 3, at 189-90
(explaining how contracting states can agree to deviate from general treaty principles). Of course, the failure to
do so could be read as reflecting state consent to such proceedings. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying
text (discussing give-and-take between legislative and judicial branches in regulatory litigation).
360. Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, % 530-31 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0236.pdf. For example, various tribunals at the PCA have adopted sampling, statistical modeling,
and similar types of sophisticated evidentiary techniques in mass claims processes. See Crook, supra note 143,
at 48 (explaining that the United Nations Compensation Commission drew on "lessons learned from U.S. mass
tort litigation" to employ such techniques).
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complex bilateral litigation and arbitration. 36 1 Therefore, determinations about the
novelty of certain mechanisms may turn on what judicial or arbitral procedures are
chosen as comparators. 36 2
At this point in the analysis, Abaclat appears to pass muster, since the proposed
procedures do not yet appear so novel as to be entirely unexpected. However, it is
possible that the arbitral tribunal could adopt procedures that are entirely unanticipated.
In that case, it may be necessary to consider the issue of novelty from a different angle.
b. Risk-Related Issues
The preceding discussion focuses on questions of novelty from a procedural
perspective. However, novelty can also be analyzed as a function of risk. In many ways,
this may be the more appropriate inquiry, given that regulatory litigation has been framed
herein as a means of protecting individual citizens from unanticipated risk. 363
The concept of "unanticipated risk" can be considered from a substantive or
procedural perspective. Normally, it would appear as if an unanticipated risk could not
arise as a substantive matter, since the second prong of the test for regulatory litigation
and arbitration requires the existence of a pre-established substantive norm. 364 However,
an exception to this general rule may arise in the context of investment arbitration.
Abaclat provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. One of the issues raised
in the dispute involved the extent to which the relevant treaties applied to sovereign
bonds.36 5 The assertion of this claim as a matter of first impression was justified by the
claimants on the grounds that "opening the door to ICSID arbitration would create a
supplementary leverage against . . . rogue debtors and therefore be beneficial to the
efficiency of foreign debt restructuring." 366
The dissent opposed this approach, stating that
[i]n order to create ... leverage over sovereign debtors, which the ICSID
Convention did not foresee and which financial markets did not contemplate,
then or now, the majority award fashions an unprecedented procedure for
adjudicating the present claim of more than 60.000 [sic] holders of Argentinean
361. For example, the Abaclat majority noted the possible use of scanned documents as opposed to
originals, a practice that has long been used in complex commercial arbitration and litigation. See Abaclat,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 531; Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 39. It is also common for parties in complex
bilateral proceedings to stipulate to the introduction of a single representative document in situations involving
multiple identical (or functionally identical) copies. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 531 (noting
possible use of limits on evidentiary material).
362. The issue of proper comparators was raised in the context of U.S. class arbitrations, when the majority
in AT&T decided to compare the length of class arbitration to the length of bilateral arbitration. See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011). The dissent argued that the comparison should
more properly be made between class arbitration and class actions. See id. at 1750 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
363. See Luff, supra note 21, at 75-76 (discussing how regulatory litigation arose as a necessary means of
addressing "latent social risks").
364. See id. at 113; see also supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (explaining the three-pronged test
of regulatory litigation as a risk regulator).
365. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 35 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (identifying the sovereign debt issue).
366. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,1 514.
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debt, out of... the tribunal's gap-filling powers under article 44 of the ICSID
Convention. Driven in part by controversial policy considerations, hidden
behind references to the spirit of the ICSID Convention and the purpose of the
BIT, the majority award ... adopt[s] the Claimant's policy arguments over the
Respondent's. 36 7
Although observers will come to different conclusions as to whether the majority's
decision was proper under the relevant treaties, the important issue for the current
discussion is the way in which the dissent appears to characterize the majority award as
using procedural mechanisms in conjunction with a pre-existing substantive norm as a
means of addressing an unanticipated risk of harm. 368 This neatly encapsulates both the
method and purpose of regulatory litigation and arbitration 369 and thereby suggests that
investment arbitration may be capable of addressing unanticipated substantive risks
through techniques associated with regulatory arbitration. 370
The second type of risk analysis is more common. Here, the unanticipated risk refers
not to the type of injury (as was the case with the preceding example), but instead to
either the scope of injury (such as an unanticipated volume of harm) or the nature of the
injury (such as an unexpectedly low value of each individual claim). 37 1 In these
situations, the state anticipated a particular type of harm (described in the relevant
substantive norm) but did not anticipate the possibility that the method of addressing the
harm (i.e., standard bilateral litigation or arbitration) would be incapable of sufficiently
deterring the behavior in question. This scenario can be described as involving an
unanticipated procedural risk, since certain unexpected aspects of the injury lead to the
need to use a particular procedural mechanism (i.e., class, mass, or collective techniques)
to provide an adequate legal response. 372
Allowing regulatory litigation techniques in situations like these provides flexibility
in regulatory matters, in that the state enacting the relevant national law or adopting the
relevant investment treaty only needs to identify a particular type of unlawful behavior
and not all of the various ways in which that behavior may cause harm.373 The Abaclat
majority appears to accept this notion, based on statements indicating that
367. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/0715, N265 (Abi-Saab, dissenting).
368. See id (discussing procedural approach adopted by the claimants and majority).
369. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing three-pronged test for regulatory
litigation).
370. Here, the argument-though disputed-is that treaty law should be used "to provide a global
regulatory environment favourable to investors." Mills, supra note 15, at 501.
371. See Abaclat, ICSJD Case No. ARB/07/5, 1484 (discussing the need for various forms of collective
redress); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (discussing need in the context of U.S.
class actions); Strong, De-Americanization,supranote 43, at 502 (discussing need as the driving force for new
forms of class or collective arbitration); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 1)
(discussing need for regulatory litigation in the European Union).
372. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 484 (discussing need as the underlying factor for the
development of collective proceedings); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 445 U.S. at 339 (discussing need in the
context of U.S. class actions); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 43, at 502 (discussing need as the
driving force for the development of new forms of class or collective arbitration); Strong, Regulatory Litigation,
supra note 25 (manuscript at 46) (discussing need as a function of an effective remedy).
373. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 45-46) (discussing the flexibility of
regulatory litigation); see also supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text (discussing flexibility in treaty
interpretation).
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[t]he need for certain adaptations to the standard ICSID arbitration procedure
merely derives from the impossibility to anticipate all kinds of possible
investments and disputes, and is certainly not a sufficient motive to simply
close the door of ICSID arbitration to investors who are not "standard
investors" having made "standard investments." 374
Flexibility may be particularly appropriate or necessary in international investment
arbitration, given the practical difficulties associated with amending multilateral
agreements once they are in place. 375 However, flexibility needs to be tempered with
predictability if the investment regime is to operate efficiently. 376 While it is always
difficult to balance these two principles, parties and arbitrators should not be excessively
fearful of exercising an appropriate degree of flexibility, since political actors always
have the last word regarding regulatory litigation and arbitration. 377
378
A second type of procedural risk involves the possibility of inconsistent awards.
Some commentators in the investment arena have noted that "the individual adjudication
of investment disputes can lead, and has led, to 'inconsistent . . . adjudications with

respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class."' 379 Indeed, "[o]ne need look no further than
the Lauder and CME cases to put to rest all doubts that this 'risk' has indeed become a
reality in investment arbitration, and [that class, mass, or collective proceedings] would

374. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 519.
375. See DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 211 (noting that because the ICSID Convention is based "in public
international law, changes can only be implemented with great difficulty").
376. See Mills, supra note 15, at 502 (discussing differing views regarding the flexibility of the investment
regime); Potestd, supra note 282 (discussing flexibility in investment law); Trakman, supra note 274, at 3
(discussing need for predictability in investment law).
377. In regulatory litigation, political actors can overrule a judicial decision that unduly restricts or
expands certain remedies. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (discussing how the legislature and
judiciary mutually monitor each other's actions). In regulatory arbitration in the investment context, states can
either withdraw from or refuse to enter the system if they disagree with the direction in which investment law is
headed, procedurally or substantively. See Born, supra note 229, at 844 (discussing how only a few states have
renounced the system); Luke Eric Peterson, In Policy Switch, Australia Disavows Need for Investor-State
Arbitration Provisions in Trade and Investment Agreements, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110414 (noting Australia has declined to enter into investment arbitration
regime); Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela's Withdrawal from ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsidwhat-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/ (noting Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have withdrawn from the ICSID
Convention). Notably, the Abaclat dissent suggests "[t]he risk of back-lash is already pointing its head" as a
result of Abaclat and other similarly broad decisions. Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 274 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting),
available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf.
378. Ironically, Argentina has complained in the past "that multiple arbitral claims by a multiplicity of
indirect shareholders in a single company have the potential to sow legal confusion-particularly where the
minority shareholders pursue a litigation strategy that has been disavowed by the majority shareholders of a
given company." Luke Eric Peterson, Majority Opinion in ICSID Bondholders Claim Has BroaderLessons for
Defaulting Sovereigns, FracturedTribunals, Shareholder Groupings, and Would-Be Claimants Needing Help
Getting ICSID Claims Registered, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Aug. 19, 2011), www.iareporter.com/articles
/20110819 2.
379. DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 204 (citation omitted).
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do much to provide the legislative groundwork to prevent this from occurring again." 380
This has led some commentators to ask whether a class model of investment arbitration
could constitute "a potential solution to the current problem of multiplicity of
proceedings and general incoherency in international investment dispute resolution." 3 81
Class and collective actions have long been used in the judicial realm as a means of
avoiding inconsistent judgments, although these procedures appear to be justified
primarily as a matter of efficiency rather than pursuant to any sort of regulatory
rationale. 382 However, framing the analysis as a function of risk could provide an
interesting means of addressing concerns about the novelty of mass procedures in
investment arbitration, since it would provide a principled reason for allowing large-scale
litigation techniques to be used in situations such as that presented in Abaclat.383
Framing the issue as one of unanticipated risk resolves many of the problems
associated with the claim that the procedures proposed in Abaclat are too novel to qualify
as the sort of rule or remedy contemplated by the third prong of the three-part test for
regulatory litigation and arbitration. This sort of analysis may also be useful in
overcoming issues in future mass claims arbitrations. However, it is still necessary to
address issues relating to silence.
2. Issues Relating to Silence
The second major problem with respect to class, mass, or collective proceedings in
the investment context involves the silence of the governing instruments regarding largescale dispute resolution devices. 384 This is a potentially fatal concern under the third
element of the test relating to regulatory litigation and arbitration, which requires a rule,
typically in the form of a remedy, "that expresses the [substantive] norm to the world and
attempts to limit the threats (risk) to that norm." 385

380. Id. at 205. In CME and Lauder, the Czech Republic's refusal to consolidate two different arbitrations
led to two contradictory awards. See id at 206 (citing CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech
Republic (UNCITRAL) and Ronald S. Lauder v. the Czech Republic (UNCITRAL)) (discussing contradicting
awards in CME and Lauder).
381. Id. at 185.
382. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) (noting efficiency rationale behind class actions).
383. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/ita0236.pdf (allowing large-scale litigation techniques to be used in an investment arbitration). Issues relating
to inconsistent awards in investment arbitration are beyond the scope of this Article, though further reading is
available. See generally Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public InternationalLaw Through InconsistentDecisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521 (2005) (discussing issues
relating to inconsistent arbitral rewards).
384. In Abaclat, the key question was whether the silence in the treaties and procedural rules constituted a
procedural gap or a "qualified silence" that could be filled by the arbitrators. Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, f 297, 517 (Oct.
28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf
Issues relating to the interpretation of statutory or contractual silence can be extremely difficult. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 1.L.M. 679 (stating that the
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with its object and purpose); McLACHLAN ET AL., supra
note 10, at 66; see also Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 151, at 1055-83 (discussing interpretation of
silence or ambiguity regarding class treatment in the context of international commercial arbitration).
385. Luff, supra note 21, at 114. Some question exists as to whether class relief constitutes the relevant
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In the quintessential form of regulatory litigation, the U.S. class action, the
regulatory remedy is embodied in judicial rules of procedure and is therefore known prior
to the initiation of any individual action. 386 This would suggest that any legal system
(including the international investment regime) that does not explicitly provide in
advance for class, mass, or collective mechanisms cannot adopt a form of regulatory
litigation or arbitration that relies on one of these sorts of large-scale litigation
techniques.
However, the historical development of class arbitration in the United States
3 87
While contemporary forms of
suggests an alternative means of analyzing the issue.
class arbitration rely largely on certain pre-existing arbitral rules that function in a
38 8
class arbitration was
manner somewhat similar to that of judicial rules of procedure,
available in the United States for approximately 20 years prior to the adoption of the first
set of procedural rules. 389 In those early cases, class arbitration was not based on any
specific legislative or procedural authority but instead constituted a particular type of
remedy responding to a unique and previously unanticipated legal scenario (i.e., the
existence of an arbitration agreement in a situation where a class claim could be and had
been asserted). 390 In those situations, class arbitration was sometimes considered to be
the best option available, since "an order for classwide arbitration . . . would call for

39 1
considerably less intrusion upon the contractual aspects of the relationship."
The historical evolution of class arbitration in the United States therefore suggests
that a form of regulatory arbitration could develop in the investment context even in the

rule or remedy, or whether the class procedure simply facilitates the provision of a more traditional type of
remedy (i.e., damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory judgment). See Strong, Regulatory Litigation,supra note
25 (manuscript at 42-50) (describing how the combination of traditional remedies with large-scale litigation
techniques can help meet the requirements for bottom-up regulatory litigation); see also supra note 72. For ease
of discussion, this Article frames the argument as if class, mass, or collective relief constitutes the relevant rule
or remedy.
386. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (providing a trans-substantive rule of procedure allowing class relief).
Individual U.S. states have their own rules of procedure governing class suits. Other jurisdictions, including
Australia and most Canadian provinces and territories, place the class action remedy in legislation rather than
rules of procedure. See MULHERON, supra note 7, at 38-42, 63-66 (discussing class action legislation).
387. Claimants in Abaclat cited the common law development of class arbitrations in the United States to
support their argument that the tribunal in Abaclat could follow a similar path. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, 1 146 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (discussing development of class arbitration in the United States).
388. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 154, R. 1(a) (noting the adoption of any of the AAA
rules of arbitration can lead to the use of the class arbitration rules in cases where a class claim has been made,
but indicating that class procedures will not be deemed appropriate until the arbitral tribunal has so decided
after briefing from the parties); JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 154, R. 1(b) (stating that class
action procedures apply to any dispute arising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to any
of the JAMS rules where a party submits a dispute to arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported
class).
389. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982) (indicating class arbitration was a
proper dispute resolution mechanism), rev'don othergrounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984); Strong, FirstPrinciples,supra note 151, at 206 (discussing evolution of class arbitration in the United
States).
390. See Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 (holding class arbitration is a legitimate means of resolving disputes);
Born & Salas, supra note 150, at 25-30 (exploring the history of class arbitration in the United States prior to
2003).
391. Keating,645 P.2dat 1209.
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absence of any specific provisions in the relevant treaties or procedural rules discussing
class, mass, or collective procedures. Critics will likely oppose this proposal, arguing that
the development of class arbitration in the United States was possible only because the
United States: (1) explicitly embraced the concept of large-scale litigation prior to the
development of class arbitration, 392 (2) had a longstanding familiarity with class
proceedings in the judicial context and thus had created a social and legal environment
where class proceedings were not unexpected, 393 and (3) is a common law jurisdiction
that permits incremental change through judicial action. 394 Because parties to most
(though not all) international investment arbitrations will not (1) have a commonly agreed
regulatory mechanism already in place in their national judicial systems, let alone in their
investment treaties, (2) share similar views as to the propriety or shape of regulatory
litigation, let alone regulatory arbitration, 39 5 and (3) follow the common law legal
method, allowing a form of regulatory arbitration to develop informally in investment
disputes is inappropriate in the absence of explicit legislative or state action. 396
There are a variety of ways of responding to these concerns. 397 For example, it
could be said that widespread international consensus regarding the availability, shape, or
use of large-scale litigation techniques is unnecessary and that the only countries whose
views should be considered are those that are parties to the international agreements
underlying the proceeding. 398 However, even this sort of limitation could lead to a
392. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (providing for class relief). Although the mechanism authorizing class actions
is found in the rules of civil procedure, those rules are approved by Congress. See Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-72, 2074 (2006) (requiring congressional approval of rules of court, including the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
393. Although this argument will likely be raised, it is somewhat incorrect as a factual matter, given that
corporate respondents believed that the use of arbitration agreements would eliminate the class remedy in both
litigation and arbitration and were therefore surprised by the development of class arbitration. See Strong, First
Principles,supra note 151, at 226 (explaining how many corporate respondents created arbitration agreements
to avoid the possibility of judicial class actions).
394. Notably, this argument ignores the fact that non-common law jurisdictions such as Colombia,
Germany, and Spain have contemplated the development of class or collective arbitration. See supranotes 151,
161-65 and accompanying text (discussing development of large-scale arbitration outside the United States). In
two of those three examples-Colombia and Germany-the impetus came from the judiciary as opposed to the
legislature. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 6, 2009, II ZR 255/08 (Ger.); Kuck &
Litt, supra note 9, at 720-23 (discussing the single instance of class arbitration in Colombia); Borris, supra note
162; Strong, DIS, supranote 162, at 47.
395. While a growing number of legal systems allow for some form of collective redress, there is no
consensus as to the appropriate shape of those proceedings or whether those mechanisms serve a regulatory end.
See supra note 57 (describing various forms of collective redress internationally).
396. See DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 205 (discussing jurisdictions that use large-scale litigation as a
regulatory device).
397. Two of these responses arise as a factual matter. See supra note 57 (describing various forms of
collective redress internationally).
398. Although Abaclat only involved two countries, it is theoretically possible for mass investment
arbitrations to include parties from more than two nations. See DIMSEY, supra note 11, at 212 (noting
similarities of bilateral investment treaties may lead to multinational claimant groups in investment arbitration);
see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
513 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/caseJurisdiction and Admissibility,
documents/ita0236.pdf (suggesting "claims are proper and manageable" in part because "[c]laimants are from a
single jurisdiction"); supra note 275 (discussing viability of multinational claimant groups in investment
arbitration).
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situation where, as in Abaclat, one or more of the states at issue do not provide for
collective redress for the type of injury in question. 399
Some people may believe, along with the dissent in Abaclat, that the absence of any
large-scale mechanism in national courts is irrelevant so long as a bilateral remedy is
available as a matter of national law. 400 However, other people may see the absence of a
class, mass, or collective remedy as violating the duty to provide fair and equitable
treatment pursuant to the terms of the relevant investment treaty 40 1 or alternatively as
breaching the right to an effective remedy as a matter of natural justice. 402 Given that
some commentators believe that "[t]he protection offered to investors by the dispute
resolution provisions of treaties is sufficiently important to rise to the level of a
substantive principle in its own right," 403 the failure to provide some sort of realistic
remedy would be highly problematic. 404
In such cases, the question would ultimately turn on a factual determination of
whether a class, mass, or collective action was the only way to provide an effective
remedy, even in the absence of a specific treaty or procedural provision specifically
discussing such a procedure. 40 5 In Abaclat, the majority suggested that "the rejection of

484, 587 (noting Argentina did not provide for collective
399. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
redress in its national courts); see also Hdctor A. Mairal, Argentina, in THE ANNALS, supra note 26, at 54, 5462 (discussing the current status of group, class, or collective rights in Argentina). Italy does not provide for
"any form of group litigation as a general procedural tool for the protection and the enforcement of rights and
interests shared by a group of individuals equally affected by the same mass wrong or harm," although some
select rights of collective action exist. Elisabetta Silvestri, Italy, in THE ANNALS, supra note 26, at 138
(discussing availability of large-scale judicial relief in Italy). Notably, the lack of a collective remedy at national
law was one reason why the claimants found it necessary to file a mass claim under the relevant investment
treaty. See Abaclat, ICSID Case. No. ARB/07/5, $T 484, 587 (noting no collective remedy existed in
Argentina's national courts).
400. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, T 33 (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, dissenting), availableat http://italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf (stating the claimants should have pursued actions in Argentinean
courts on a bilateral basis).
401. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 227-33 (discussing breaches leading to a denial of justice
in the national courts); see also Nagareda, supra note 23, at 36 (suggesting "a class action might well be all the
more 'superior' to available procedural alternatives when the home country of a given shareholder affords her
no avenue for recourse on an aggregate basis").
402. The right to an effective remedy is gaining increasing importance as a matter of national,
international, and regional law. See European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by protocols nos. 11
and 14, art. 13 (entered into force June 1, 2010), available at www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7(requiring an effective remedy for
DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTIONENGWEB.pdf
anyone "whose rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention are violated"); Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, 2000/C 364/1, art. 47, Dec. 18, 2000, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/
charter/pdf/text-en.pdf (requiring an effective remedy for anyone whose "rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
law of the Union are violated"); Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, $T 484, 587 (recognizing the importance
of an effective remedy); Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in the United Kingdom, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 457, 457-58 (2000) (describing availability of the right to an effective remedy as a matter of national,
international, and regional law); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supranote 25 (manuscript at 45-46) (discussing
the recognition of an effective remedy nationally, internationally, and regionally).
403.

MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 45.

404.
405.

See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 484 (discussing whether an effective remedy existed).
The majority in Abaclat took the view that

[c]ollective proceedings emerge[ ] where they constitute[ ] the only way to ensure an effective
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the admissibility of the present claims may equal a denial of justice," which would "be
shocking given that the investment at stake is protected under the BIT, which expressly
provides for ICSID jurisdiction and arbitration." 406 Other investment tribunals may come
to a similar conclusion under other investment agreements.
Objections to class, mass, or collective procedures could also be raised on
constitutional grounds, in that some legal systems view certain types of large-scale
litigation and arbitration techniques as violative of parties' individual participatory
rights. 4 07 As such, an investment tribunal might not be seen as capable of setting these
constitutional protections aside. 408
These types of constitutional concerns have been implicated most frequently in
cases involving opt-out representative relief, since those procedures allegedly infringe on
the plaintiffs' or claimants' right to choose when, where, and whether to pursue a legal
claim. 409 Cases involving opt-in or aggregative relief may experience fewer difficulties
in this regard, although respondents may still argue that their right to mount an
individualized defense would be hindered in any sort of group proceeding. 4 10 While this

remedy in protection of a substantive right provided by contract or law; in other words, collective
proceedings [a]re seen as necessary, where the absence of such mechanism would de facto . . .
result[ ] in depriving the claimants of their substantive rights due to the lack of appropriate
mechanism.
Id. 1 484 (citing Strong, De-Americanization,supra note 43, at 238-39). The dissent denied that failure to allow
the claims to proceed en masse would deprive the claimants of their substantive rights. See Abaclat, ICSID Case
254-57 (Abi-Saab, dissenting) (claiming bilateral process was sufficient).
No. ARB/07/5,
406. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 537.
407. See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 29, at 32-34 (discussing constitutional objections to large-scale
litigation); Monestier, supra note 29, at 38-39 (discussing constitutional concerns relating to global class
actions); Strong, IndividualParticipatoryRights, supra note 171 (discussing how some may not view individual
participatory rights as constitutional in nature, as they "are a species of procedural rights"). Interestingly, the
Abaclat majority suggested it was protecting the effective exercise of these rights when it ordered mass
arbitration, given that having to face thousands of individual arbitral "proceedings would be a much bigger
challenge to Argentina's effective defense rights than a mere limitation of its right to individual treatment of
homogenous claims in the present proceedings." Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 545.
408. See Bignami, supra note 23 (discussing European resistance to U.S.-style analysis of regulatory
litigation); Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 71, at 295-96 (discussing the continued importance of
domestic principles of law in transnational litigation); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript
at 4-6) (discussing constitutional concerns regarding large-scale litigation).
409. See In re Vivendi Universal, No. 02 Civ. 5571, 2009 WL 855799, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009)
(discussing constitutional concerns about opt-out representative relief in global class actions); Buxbaum,
Securities, supra note 29, at 32-34 (discussing constitutional concerns regarding large-scale international
litigation); Monestier, supra note 29, at 38-39 (discussing different countries' approach to large-scale
litigation); Strong, Individual ParticipatoryRights, supra note 171 (discussing the constitutional concerns of
individual participatory rights).
410. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, T$ 487-88 (acknowledging that collective relief can affect
the ability to mount an individualized defense); Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, TT 139-45, 239-44 (AbiSaab, dissenting) (objecting to use of mass procedures in cases involving non-homogenous claims); Strong,
Mass Torts, supranote 39 (explaining how "A baclat provides a useful recognition of the various types of class
and collective relief now available in arbitration"); Strong, Individual ParticipatoryRights, supra note 171
(discussing how "individual victims should remain free not to pursue the opt-in collective action but instead to
seek redress individually"). However, courts, commentators, and arbitrators have found that if the claims are
sufficiently homogenous, then the right to mount an individualized defense is not affected in any way. See WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (analyzing the issue as a matter of commonality);
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issue does not appear to be problematic in Abaclat, given the homogeneity of the claims
at issue and the presence of specific individual consent on an opt-in rather than opt-out
basis, the matter bears further analysis. 4 11
Therefore, although issues relating to novelty and silence create a number of
significant concerns under the third prong of the test for regulatory litigation and
arbitration, Abaclat appears to fulfill the necessary requirements. 4 12 This determination is
based on, among other things, the vital importance of the right to an effective dispute
resolution mechanism in the investment context 4 13 and the virtual inability of claimants
to seek recovery through other means. 4 14 The conclusion is further bolstered by the rapid
increase over the last ten years in the number and diversity of mechanisms for collective
redress in judicial and arbitral fora around the world. 4 15 Given these developments, it is
difficult to argue that a similar mechanism could not have been expected to arise in the
investment arena. Indeed, the fact that class, mass, and collective redress has become so
prevalent in such a short amount of time strongly suggests that society is currently
undergoing something of a quantum shift with respect to the type of legal injuries that are
being experienced domestically and internationally. As the types of harm evolve, so, too,
must the legal responses, both as a matter of public and private law.
VI. CONCLUSION

The jurisdictional award in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic is, with the dissenting
opinion, one of the most important decisions to arise in the investment arena in decades.
Although Argentina will likely seek annulment of the award after the conclusion of the
merits phase, 4 16 the effect of the award is already being felt throughout the international
community. Regardless of the future outcome of Abaclat itself, most commentators
would agree that the door has been opened to mass claims in the investment context, with
Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
540 (noting that large-scale relief is acceptable when claims are
homogeneous); Strong, IndividualParticipatoryRights, supranote 171 (discussing how in some jurisdictions a
defendant's interest in mounting their own individualized defense is protected as a matter of public policy,
while in other jurisdictions it exists as a fundamental constitutional right).
411. Detailed evaluation of this issue is outside the scope of this Article, although the author has conducted
related research elsewhere. See Strong, IndividualParticipatoryRights, supra note 171 (considering individual
participatory rights in cases involving cross-border collective redress).
412. The requirement for a rule or remedy appears to focus on the need to establish "that the remedy
logically follows from the wrong, rather than being fashioned on ad hoc and flexible grounds." Luff, supranote
21, at 109.
413. See McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 45 (noting the critical nature of the dispute resolution
mechanisms found in investment treaties).
414. The extent to which a remedy is necessary under investment law is disputed by the parties, but was
sufficient to win the approval of two of the three panelists. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 484
(noting no other viable method of providing a legal remedy); Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, IN254-57
(Abi-Saab, dissenting) (disputing whether other means of legal relief were available). Furthermore, developing
a large-scale litigation mechanism in the investment context as a function of need is consistent with the way in
which class and collective relief has grown in other contexts. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text
(discussing development of class and collective redress).
415. See supra notes 125, 147-63 and accompanying text (discussing the context and increase of collective
redress in various countries).
416. See Cross, supra note 12 (discussing likelihood of annulment action); Smith et al., supra note 12
(discussing Argentina's history of seeking annulment).
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the only question being when, not whether, the next mass claim will be filed. 4 17
Individual states can attempt to forestall any future claims by amending their
investment laws and agreements to prohibit the bringing of mass claims. However, that
process will likely take some time, since the international investment regime has no
equivalent of a national supreme court that can make a single sweeping judgment to stem
the tide of mass claim arbitration. Furthermore, it is unclear whether it is either necessary
or wise for states to take this type of defensive action.
The fear of many states, of course, is that the adoption of large-scale litigation
techniques in investment arbitration is going to open the floodgates to the kind of abusive
litigation culture commonly associated with U.S. class actions. 4 18 However, empirical
research shows that not all forms of collective redress are the same. 4 19 Numerous
jurisdictions have adopted national forms of class or collective relief that have not led to
widespread or abusive use of large-scale litigation. 420 Although there may be a multitude
of reasons why the incidence of class and collective redress varies so widely around the
world, the primary rationale appears to relate to the relatively high number of incentives
present in the U.S. legal system encouraging the use of large-scale litigation as both a
compensatory and regulatory device. 421 However, none of these features-i.e., opt-out
rather than opt-in or aggregative relief, punitive damages, contingency fees, and broad
judicial discovery-are present in the international investment context. 42 2
Given the problems, uncertainties, and costs associated with large-scale investment
arbitration, it appears highly unlikely that parties would choose to bring such actions as a
matter of first resort, since no rational party would want to undertake an international

417. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the impact Abaclat will have on mass filings in
investment arbitration).
418. See Resolution of the European Parliament, supra note 131, 1 2 (noting the "frivolous litigation and
abuse of the U.S. class action system").
419. See generally THE ANNALS, supra note 26 (discussing 30 different national regimes).
420. See Resolution of the European Parliament, supra note 131 (noting possible adoption of a European
form of cross-border collective redress); Directorate General, supra note 57, at 48 (noting low participation
rates in European models of collective redress); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 58) (discussing potential changes in European attitudes toward collective redress).
421. See Hensler, supra note 53, at 15-25 (discussing range of collective redress mechanisms around the
world); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 20) (discussing effect of background
principles of U.S. law on regulatory litigation).
422. See Hensler, supra note 53, at 15-25 (distinguishing U.S. class actions from other forms of largescale litigation); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 2 (noting impact of background principles of U.S. civil procedure
on class actions); Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 32) (discussing regulatory
features in U.S. large-scale litigation). Funding is one of the primary roadblocks to large-scale litigation in
national systems and will also be an issue in the investment context. In Abaclat, TFA (and thus, by extension,
the eight banks that comprised TFA) paid for claimants' attorneys and arbitration fees, a factor that the dissent
found disturbing and a potential conflict of interest. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic,
65, 425, 428, 682-85 (Aug. 4,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
2011), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf (discussing potential
conflicts of interest). While certain funding issues could be resolved through the use of third-party litigation
funders, the significant costs involved in an investment proceeding suggests that third-party funders will not
become involved unless they are virtually assured of a recovery. See Penusliski, supra note 66 (outlining
average costs of an ICSID arbitration); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1308 (2011) (noting sovereigns already use such funding mechanisms in
investment proceedings). Whether this scenario is positive or negative remains to be seen.
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investment arbitration if a cheaper, faster, and more predictable alternative were available
elsewhere. Instead, mass investment arbitration will likely only arise as a last resort,
when other methods of recourse are actually or effectively unavailable. 423 This, of
course, is consistent with the expectation and experience outside the investment context,
namely that class and collective proceedings only arise when they are necessary.424
Although regulatory litigation and arbitration may be triggered by a particular type
of need, 4 25 need alone is not enough for a particular proceeding to be considered
regulatory. Instead, there must be a regulatory intent, a relevant substantive norm, and a
4 26
These
rule or remedy that provides for a forward-looking regulatory effect.
requirements are necessary to ensure that private litigants, acting in conjunction with
judicial authorities or arbitral bodies, do not improperly infringe on the rightful
responsibilities of legislative and administrative actors.
Some people consider any form of regulatory litigation or arbitration to be an
impermissible incursion into public concerns that are best and most appropriately left to
politically accountable actors. 42 7 However, this traditional top-down, command and
control model of regulation is under fire from a variety of critics, including new
governance theorists who see the challenges of modem society as requiring a new
regulatory model built on shared public and private competencies. 4 28 Indeed, the rising
interest in regulatory litigation and arbitration as both an academic and practical matter
suggests that this shift away from conventional perspectives of regulation is well
underway.
The need to understand and develop new regulatory models is particularly pressing
in the international arena. Although the dissent in Abaclat would promote the use of
domestic courts to address the kind of large-scale injuries at stake here, there are
significant problems with that kind of national approach. These difficulties can be
analyzed from a variety of perspectives, including investment law, 429 civil procedure, 4 30
423. There also must be an appropriate factual scenario to support a mass claim, which may prove to be far
more difficult under investment law than under domestic law. See supra note 11 (discussing likelihood that
mass procedures will be used in other investment arbitrations).
424. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing need as a trigger for class, mass, or
collective relief).
425. That need can often be framed as a need to address unanticipated risk. See Luff, supra note 21, at 75,
113 (discussing regulatory litigation as a risk regulator); see also supra notes 361-70 and accompanying text
(discussing what constitutes an unanticipated risk).
426. See Luff, supra note 21, at 113 (discussing the three-prong test for regulatory litigation).
427. See id; Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 25 (manuscript at 4) (discussing various views of
the propriety of regulatory litigation).
428. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing changing views of regulation as a practical and
theoretical matter).
429. For example, questions could arise as to whether Argentinean courts could and would provide the
same kind of neutral, non-political adjudication that is assumed to be at the heart of investment arbitration. See
Bom, supra note 229, at 828 (discussing nature of investment arbitration).
430. For example, Argentina did not allow collective redress in its national courts, which led to one set of
practical problems for the Italian bondholders. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, J 484, 587 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf (discussing availability of collective redress in
Argentina). However, even if the national court in question does have a class or collective mechanism in place,
there is no guarantee that such a device will be procedurally consistent with the regulatory or procedural
regimes in other relevant countries. See supra note 109, 116 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory
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or regulatory law. 4 31 This Article has focused primarily on the regulatory perspective but
has highlighted issues from these other fields of inquiry so as to provide a more
comprehensive context for analysis.
When considering the propriety of Abaclat and the availability of large-scale
litigation techniques in investment arbitration, it is useful to consider the other
alternatives. 432 As it turns out, numerous problems exist with all of the other available
options. 433 Formal methods of international regulation are difficult to enact and slow to
respond to changes in the legal or social environment. Transnational regulatory litigation
is unpredictable and subject to the regulatory choices made by the forum state. National
forms of regulation and regulatory litigation are unable to address the increasing number
of cross-border legal harms in an effective manner. As a result, allowing a form of
regulatory arbitration to develop in investment arbitration appears to be the best way of
decreasing unpredictability and inconsistency in the international investment regime. 434
The use of mass procedures in investment arbitration is a complex topic, and this
Article is certainly not the last word on the subject. However, by considering whether and
to what extent Abaclat can be considered a form of regulatory arbitration, this Article has
attempted to put the dispute in a context that encourages broader questions about
institutional design, both within investment law and in transnational regulation more
generally. In so doing, this discussion hopefully provides a useful perspective on what is
doubtless one of the more intriguing and controversial decisions of our time.

mismatches).
431. For example, national courts often find it difficult or impossible to effectuate transnational regulation
efficiently and effectively. See supra notes 89-147 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory litigation in
the transnational context).
432. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (stating "[c]lasswide arbitration, as Sir Winston Churchill said of
democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation to its alternatives").
433. See supra notes 88-147 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory litigation in the transnational
context).
434. See supra notes 376-81 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about inconsistent awards in
arbitration).
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